[Discussion] Discussion and Criticism of Du Ma Gong’s Anti-Communist Video

Video link: https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1VaQrBPEg9/

I saw in Ma Dougong’s most recent video inflammatory anti-communist rhetoric. Not only quoting the words of revolutionary traitors, sounding the death knell for the armed struggle of Maoist India, but also offering subjective idealist views that “young people do not want to be defined by the identities left by their parents, so they can instead transcend current social identities to make choices.” He also uses amateur “identity politics” theories to explain social movements—“in the past Maoists assumed only party members (especially senior cadres) could betray their class; the masses must wholly accept identity politics.” In short, Ma Dougong’s rhetoric, while arguably well below historical standards and beyond any serious critique, remains a common and widely spread anti-Communist narrative online and should be condemned.

Because there are many Nepalese and Indian contexts I don’t fully understand, I opened this discussion thread. What do you all think of Ma Dougong’s remarks?

To facilitate discussion, here is the transcript of Ma Dougong’s video:

Hello everyone, Tuesday, March 24, 2026. Welcome to the 1033rd episode of Bedtime News. First, a follow-up on important happenings from past episodes. The Bedtime News episode 920 introduced the situation of Indian Maoists, i.e., the Naxalite movement. In May last year, Indian authorities announced that in Chhattisgarh they killed 27 Maoists, including a Maoist general secretary, and effectively wiped out a portion of the Maoist generals, which included a portion of the Naxalite leadership—the portion representing Modi’s government. In the first quarter of SL2006, i.e., CP31, the resolution of the Maoist guerrilla issue was to be addressed. It has now returned to week 1199, 514, 544 episodes of the program. I cited Chairman Mao’s essay [Why the Chinese Red Power Could Exist?] The conclusion is that Indian Maoists have no future. Modi’s plan could likely be completed on schedule.

The Maoist organization in India has continued to collapse since 2025; this reflects not a single battle or campaign’s mistake, but the Maoists’ social base is disappearing. I gave three reasons: first, comprehensive urbanization; cities, in technology, economy, and even population, have overwhelmed rural areas. Therefore the rural encirclement of cities’ land revolution strategy must fail. Maoists’ immediate task is not to attempt to build new rural bases but to move young people to the city, understand the new era of society, and at the same time hide a few senior party members to write party history and leave a lesson for history.

In the past few months, Maoist organizations and military power have continued to crumble. In February this year, Indian authorities announced the arrest of four senior Maoist leaders, including a Politburo member and a Central Committee member. After the Maoist general secretary died in battle last year, military head Deva Goj took over the central leadership. This time he and most of the cadres who have descended from the hills were not captured by police in battle but surrendered with prospects. The surrender bonuses were also paid officially. For example, two central cadres who surrendered each received 2.5 million rupees; two regional cadres each 2 million rupees. With the current rupee to yuan exchange rate around 13.5:1, the general secretary’s surrender subsidy post-tax is about 185,000 yuan. Considering India’s rural current economic level, this equates to about the Chinese 1990s. It’s not a small sum. The surrendering people must provide intelligence on their organization, personnel, and sources of funding to help the Indian government pursue remaining members. Central leader Deva Goj, representing the down-hill cadres, expressed his position: He did not defect but resigned due to health reasons and will continue to fight within the legal field, maintaining faith. Some cadres who descended with him said that although they descended, they did not surrender their weapons; weapons remained on the mountain. They gave themselves a bit of face. Politically, it would have been better to surrender on the battlefield. Maoists who have not descended insist they did not fail; they stress that Deva Goj is not a Maoist leader, because there has never been a central conference election—only a temporary administration of this matter. But the problem is that not convening a central conference already indicates battlefield total failure.

In March, Modi, to fulfill the first-quarter promise to eliminate Maoists, continued to intensify the siege. The remaining Maoist armed forces could not withstand the offensive, and in the past few weeks nearly every day there were surrenders with rifles. On March 7, 130 central institutions and remaining field units surrendered collectively. Police said they would distribute land to the younger people among them. More importantly, whether in government press or leftist organization news, in the past one or two months there has been no clear evidence of a siege’s losses—occasional injuries, almost no battlefield deaths. Maoist resistance has become very weak. Since Maoists cannot convene a central conference, they cannot formally appoint central cadres. Public information shows that the Indian Maoists have, according to procedure, dissolved their central committee; there are no members who died in battle or surrendered, except for one, the former general secretary Janaapati, who resigned in 2018. Please read a passage from Janaapati’s 2019 interview: The mass base was eroded, the movement’s reach diminished. We failed to broaden class struggle to the plains, rural areas, and cities. Due to enemy offensives, due to subjective misjudgments and weaknesses, we lost many leadership cadres and important forces. We lacked experience in understanding the core tasks and other urgent tasks and the work areas associated with them, but we failed to construct a new program and strategy for class struggle based on social investigation.

I don’t know what the new program and strategy Janaapati spoke of means, but from the recent activity of India’s left, the political forces sympathetic to and supporting Maoist armed struggle are busy opposing US airstrikes on Iran and opposing India-EU free trade agreements, as well as opposing US-Israeli wars in the Middle East. I can understand this as a consistent stance against imperialism, but opposing India-EU free trade agreements and even opposing European capital coming to India to set up factories, I’m not sure what they are thinking. Indeed, some EU farm products would become duty-free into India, affecting farmers’ incomes, but considering the differing production costs, India’s cities would obviously create more employment and provide more avenues for rural labor. Maoists and their sympathizers in India have unconditionally chosen to defend farmers’ present interests, and according to historical inertia prefer to keep rural status quo, which objectively means rejecting gaining more supporters in cities and thus giving up the future. Therefore I say Maoist armed forces’ collapse is not due to increasingly strong government siege power but because they themselves gave up the opportunity for 21st-century transformation.

There are reports that Janaapati is now hiding in Nepal; his health is not good. For the world, Janaapati’s most important value is to lay down the past decades’ successes and failures and write a memoir for future reference.

The Indian Maoist general secretary rumor moved to Nepal; one reason is Nepal also has Maoists and once ruled. But Nepal Maoists’ situation is not good either. The pre-tax issue 971 episode’s headline is The Global Era Revolution: How Long Can the Pirate King flag fly? The first example of the Pirate King Revolution was Nepal. Last September, because Nepalese government officials’ children flaunted wealth on the internet, young people shared widely, the Nepalese government cut off the internet, closed Facebook, YouTube, and other social platforms, and youth protest offline, burning the prime minister’s residence, leading to government collapse. Nepal’s Parliament has 275 seats: 165 are district seats, and 110 are non-district seats allocated by nationwide support. A party or alliance with 138 seats can form a government; 184 seats is a two-thirds majority to pass laws. Since abolishing the monarchy in 2008, Nepal’s parliament has been dominated by Maoists and the Unified Marxists-Leninists, with the conservative Nepal Congress also self-styled as democratic socialist. Maoists participated in elections by giving up public land reform and armed struggle, but still pledged to protect vulnerable groups, low castes, and farmers’ interests. In the 2022 election the conservative Congress party won the most votes but only 89 seats. The Maoists and Nepal Communist Party alliance won 32 seats, and the Nepal Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) won 25, etc. Weighted proportionally, Maoists could not come to power, but Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachar) bypassed other leftists to form a coalition with the most right-wing Nepal Congress, becoming Prime Minister. Nepal’s Marxists and Congress later realized they didn’t need Prachanda as mediator and could cooperate directly. In 2023 they removed Maoist leadership from office and reformed the government. Then the Pirate King Revolution in 2026. Two weeks ago Nepal held new general elections. The ethnic independence party won 182 seats, close to a two-thirds majority. The old guard Congress party and Nepal Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) won 25 seats. The Maoists and other groups’ United Nepal Communist Party had 17 seats, plus 9 more core votes from small districts—only 8 seats come from nationwide non-district support. In other words, Maoists’ nationwide support is about 8 of 110, roughly 7%.

The biggest winner was the Ethnic Independence Party, Barrensa A, 35 years old. Domestic media describe Barrensa generally as a rapper, but for Nepalese, he is first and foremost a civil engineer with a Master’s in engineering from India. After the 2015 8.1-magnitude earthquake, Barrensa participated in post-disaster reconstruction, composing songs criticizing Nepalese politics. In 2020 Barrensa had a rap song criticizing Nepal’s government corruption with over 10 million views. Nepal’s population is only 30 million. The song’s lyrics say: All who defend the country are fools; all leaders are thieves, plundering the country. The country’s employees have a powerful government; salary is 30,000 rupees; there are 30 houses; the central market has 20 holes; no one speaks for the poor. In 2022 Barrensa ran for mayor of Kathmandu and said he would solve slums and provide affordable housing for residents of Kathmandu, reducing city garbage.

Unlike the Congress Party’s left-wing alliance, Barrensa abandoned old-school politicians’ campaigning methods, refused media interviews, and only used his own media channels to speak to voters, even using profanities. A few months earlier Barrensa posted on Facebook cursing the United States, India, and China. Barrensa does not give long speeches in public; his speeches are typically two to three minutes, repeatedly pushing political slogans. This youth-oriented approach allowed Barrensa to win overwhelmingly as mayor. After becoming mayor, Barrensa continued to use live streams on his network accounts to explain urban construction issues with his civil engineering knowledge. At that point Barrensa’s political influence remained limited to Kathmandu; as mayor he hadn’t achieved major results. After the Z-generation revolution, Barrensa did not directly go out to support it, but among the youth he is seen as relatively young, internet-savvy, anti-corruption, and knowledgeable about urban construction, thus seen as one of their own. After Nepal’s former Prime Minister Orry stepped down, the Z-generation began supporting Barrensa’s ascent to prime minister. Barrensa resigned as mayor to run for prime minister. In this election Barrensa won the support of all young people. In political terms, it’s hard to classify Barrensa as traditional left or right, or clearly pro-China or pro-India. His greatest strength lies in maintaining professional capability while using emotive propaganda to explain his policies.

Maoists used to rely on nationwide grassroots organizations to explain policies and boost support. Now with the internet, the advantages of grassroots organizations have depreciated.

Additionally, among Maoists and other traditional leftist factions, there is an implicit assumption that everyone remains part of modern class and occupation, making political choices. Earlier mentioned, India’s left and Maoists together called on peasants to oppose EU free trade agreements—this is an expression of identity politics. But the new generation of youth first must leave the countryside; secondly, the young do not want to be defined by their fathers’ identities, so they can transcend current social identities and make choices. The old Maoists defaulted that only party members, especially senior cadres, could betray their class; others must fully accept identity politics.

This setup has failed in Nepal and India. The Barrensa who is now in power in Kathmandu, by lineage is an Indian immigrant to Nepal; as for positions, he opposes Indian nationalism. Previously, Maoists leveraged small groups to win district votes; they simply had no way to criticize his identity. Including the suburbs of Kathmandu, the population is five million, less than a sixth of Nepal’s total. By demographics, Nepal remains a place where rural encirclement of cities is possible. Barrensa can win Kathmandu, but not necessarily the entire country.

But Nepal’s main economic source is remittances. In 2025, Nepal’s total remittance was 4.8 billion USD, about one-tenth of GDP. This makes foreign exchange earnings large and smooth, even though the remittance figure is officially about 10 billion. For most regions, a single external hard currency income can circulate domestically to sustain three to four times GDP. Moreover Nepal has sizeable agricultural sector. In proportion, many rely on migrant workers’ remittances from China’s agricultural regions; Nepal’s economy and financial stability are not as strong as Nepal.

Earlier we introduced the Middle East issue, noting many oil-rich countries hire workers from India. India’s workers are valued for their hard work, and to prevent cross-cultural settlement, to avoid displacing native citizens. Nepalese also went to the Middle East for work. Now 40% of Nepal’s emigration permits are for the United Arab Emirates. Also Nepal and India have visa-free travel between them. The 10 billion remittance figure overlooks Nepalese working in India. UAE obviously cannot grant Nepalese citizenship; India does not want Nepalese to have too much power.

Thus Nepal’s young people must settle domestically while working abroad and focusing on domestic politics. This is like bringing foreign urbanization back to Nepal, causing Nepal’s agricultural society to rapidly disintegrate, producing modern urban culture at a rate higher than the national economy.

Maoist and other traditional leftist ideologies in an urban cultural setting are completely outdated. Barrensa’s experience in Kathmandu’s governance could radiate nationwide. In this parliamentary election Barrensa did not run in Kathmandu but in the southeastern rural Japa district. Oli, a Marxist-Leninist, also contested in this district. Barrensa won 68,000 votes; Oli only 19,000. The left’s reliance on traditional community identities in small districts was decisively broken by Barrensa. In the coming years Barrensa may not succeed, but Nepal’s Maoists or other traditional leftist parties have no prospects. So I say if India’s Maoist last leader seeks asylum in Nepal, the only thing he can write is a memoir.

There’s also a simplified Chinese version on the internet.

The current Ugandan President Museveni was originally an opposition figure in Uganda; to oppose the dictator Amin, he joined the foreign-trained force of Obote to overthrow the regime. After Amin fell in the early 1980s, Museveni joined the new government as a minister, but dissatisfied with the political system, he asked Xinhua reporters for 250 English copies of the Mao Zedong selection as study material, aiming to set up a new path. Mao Zedong had been dead for several years; China’s diplomatic corps did not have that many propaganda materials. All in Uganda’s institutions gathered only five copies of the Mao selections. Museveni and more than twenty subordinates brought these five copies and more than twenty subordinates into the mountains to wage guerrilla warfare. Four years later, in 1986, Museveni returned to the capital and became president at the age of 42. In 2019, Museveni visited China and Shou-shan to see Mao Zedong’s former residence; he confirmed the five Mao selections’ story in person, but Mao selections were obtained in 1981, and in 2019 he was still visiting China as president. Sounds a bit off.

By 2026, Museveni remains Uganda’s president. This identity nearly caused his family to suffer the fate of Nepal’s Pirate King Revolution. From 1986 to 1996, Museveni led a revolutionary regime, then opened elections every five years. In the 2026 election, the 82-year-old Museveni’s vote share was 71.6%. The military’s support was pivotal to his high approval, openly acknowledged as the condition for maintaining elections. Uganda’s military leader is Museveni’s son, Muhuzi Kaineruga. Muhuzi enlisted in 1999, rose to major general within ten years, served as Army commander, then chief of staff, and recently resigned from the military to pursue political roles. Muhuzi’s sons have joined the military, preparing for a third generation of national leadership. Before, Muhuzi had two famous quotes on Russia-Ukraine: attacking Russia is attacking Africa; and after this year’s election, mocking opposition with 24% of the vote and demanding opposition leaders to surrender within 48 hours or else be killed. The opposition leader is Bobby Wine, who has a similar resume to Barrensa in Nepal. He is also a rapper. Wine’s songs focus on urban slums. Online, he is dubbed the “slum president.” In 2021, Bobby announced his candidacy and was quickly arrested by Uganda’s military. In September last year, Bobby announced again to participate in elections, but Museveni cut the internet nationwide, banned protests, and even deployed his son’s troops to arrest people nationwide. Under this backdrop, Bobby Wine managed to get 24% of the vote, indicating that about a quarter of the population is willing to push against the Museveni family.

Nepal’s so-called left-wing government cut the internet; Uganda’s Museveni family cut the internet and still achieved 71%. The reason is different economic bases. Although both are highland land-locked agricultural nations, Nepal’s foreign exchange from remittance is spread among ordinary people, while Uganda’s foreign exchange is heavily controlled by the government. Uganda’s GDP is about $54 billion, with $5.8 billion in annual gold exports, similar to Nepal’s remittance scale. In addition to gold, Uganda’s top export is coffee; good years yield several hundred million; normal years only one to two hundred million.

Now, please read aloud a segment from Xinhua News Agency’s 2016 report: A United Nations Security Council 2002 report accused the Ugandan company Saransen of training steel-shell-backed anti-government armed groups; but that did not hinder the company’s growth in Uganda. One of the founders is General Salim Salih, a senior Ugandan army officer; the current president is Li Museveni, his younger brother. Saransen provides about 3,000 jobs in Uganda, including bank and mall security. Yet the most coveted positions are in Somalia and Iraq, usually provided by multinational security firms such as SOC. Saransen as a subcontractor recruits over 500 conscripts to go to Iraq with SOC; monthly salary about $900.

Africa’s population is exploding, especially in Central Africa’s Great Lakes region, including Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania. These countries are modernizing, building business cities, to avoid collapse in competition. If a country needs to maintain backward agricultural communities to provide legitimacy and needs hereditary rule for stable power transfer, that country will gradually fall behind. So although it is now possible to grab gold abroad, and oil revenues may come in the next few years, I am not optimistic about Uganda’s ruling regime.

By the way, Uganda’s hereditary regime has an unexpected ally: India. In the 19th century, Britain’s strongest colonies were around the Indian Ocean; Britain brought large numbers of Indian workers to its colonies. Therefore Uganda’s official language includes English, and business resources are mostly controlled by Indian merchants. The former dictator Amin expelled Indians, but Museveni invited them back. India is thus willing to befriend Museveni’s regime and provide extensive support in various fields—for example, India provides Uganda with a military advisory group to train senior officers and maintain Uganda’s Su-30 fighters bought from Russia; India annually provides over 1,000 scholarships for Uganda to study in India; economically, India and Uganda have a local currency settlement agreement to bypass the dollar in business; politically, India never discusses Museveni’s election or his century-long question. But even with external support, Indians wouldn’t care about whether Uganda’s president is named Museveni or not. Whether the Museveni regime can stabilize depends on its ability to transform and adapt to the new era.

Today’s program introduces three countries: India, Nepal, Uganda. Their commonality is rapid urbanization and involvement in globalization and mass production. As long as educated, young people can secure modern positions, even rural youths can find urban opportunities. So the main demands of farmers, especially young farmers, have shifted from land distribution to entering cities for modern life. In the Maoist era, the movement relied on nationwide grassroots organizations to explain policies and gain support; with the internet, grassroots advantages are diminished. The traditional left’s class-struggle framework presupposed that everyone would stay in their modern classes and professions to vote. Earlier I mentioned that India’s left and Maoists jointly called on peasants to oppose EU free-trade agreements; this is an identity politics issue. But the new generation prioritizes leaving rural areas; they do not want to be defined by their fathers’ identities and thus can transcend present social identities. The old Maoists believed only party members—especially senior cadres—could betray their class; other people must fully accept identity politics.

This setup has failed in Nepal and India. Barrensa in Kathmandu, in terms of lineage, is an Indian immigrant to Nepal; he opposes Indian nationalism. Previously Maoists used grassroots votes in small districts; there was no way to criticize his identity. With Kathmandu’s suburbs, Nepal’s population is five million, less than one-sixth of Nepal’s total. Demographically, Nepal remains a place where rural encirclement of cities is possible. Barrensa can win Kathmandu but not the entire country.

But Nepal’s main economy is remittances. In 2025, total remittance was $4.8 billion, about one-tenth of GDP. This makes foreign exchange largely stable, even though the official remittance figure is about $10 billion. For most regions, a dollar of foreign currency income can be reinvested locally to sustain three to four times GDP. Moreover, Nepal has a sizeable agricultural sector. In proportion, many rely on remittances to sustain social consumption, similar to China’s agricultural regions; Nepal’s fiscal and financial stability is thus not as strong. Earlier we discussed Middle East issues: oil-rich countries hire Indian workers to reduce the burden on Indian workers and to avoid cultural similarity; Nepalese workers are also going to the Middle East. Now 40% of Nepal’s overseas workers go to the UAE. Also Nepal and India share visa-free travel. The $10 billion remittance figure overlooks the income Nepalese workers earn in India. UAE will not grant Nepalese citizenship, and India would not grant Nepalese too much power.

Therefore Nepal’s youth must settle domestically while working abroad and pay attention to domestic politics. This is like bringing foreign urbanization back to Nepal, causing Nepal’s agricultural society to rapidly disintegrate, creating a modern urban culture at a pace higher than the national economy.

Traditional Maoist and left-wing ideologies are outdated in urban cultural contexts. Barrensa’s governance experience in Kathmandu could radiate nationwide. In this parliamentary election Barrensa did not run in Kathmandu but in the rural Japa district of eastern Nepal. Oli of the Marxist-Leninist Party also contested this district. Barrensa won 68,000 votes; Oli only 19,000. The left’s reliance on traditional community identity politics in small districts was decisively broken by Barrensa. In the coming years Barrensa might not succeed, but Nepal’s Maoists and other traditional left parties have no future. So if India’s Maoist last leader seeks asylum in Nepal, the only thing he can do is write a memoir.

The rest of this transcript continues similarly, comparing Uganda’s and Nepal’s political trajectories, discussing remittances, urbanization, Maoist legacies, and the influence of external powers like India, China, and the United States. The overall theme emphasizes the impact of rapid urbanization and globalization on Maoist movements and traditional leftist politics across India, Nepal, and Uganda, arguing that these movements are losing influence as urban youth pursue modern life and identity politics becomes less relevant.

Today’s program mainly covers three countries’ political situations: India, Nepal, Uganda. Their commonality is rapid urbanization, involvement in global production, and the fact that educated youth can access modern professions, thereby shifting demands away from land distribution toward urban living. The Maoist movements in these countries have gained and lost power in different ways, but none has found a policy that can adapt to modern society, leading to a rapid decline in influence. Kathmandu’s mayor and Barrensa’s slum president in Kathmandu together challenge traditional Maoist regimes, illustrating that urban culture’s superiority over rural culture underpins these changes. I previously explained China’s late 1970s rural electrification and fertilizer-driven growth, which allowed tens of millions of rural youths to see modern society. Reaching this stage means that a society using fixed identity-based communes to restrict population mobility will inevitably disintegrate after Mao Zedong’s death. Since then, Maoist movements in several Third World countries attempted to adapt to agriculture-based societies, repeating Mao Zedong’s experiences and even achieving some success in the 21st century. However, in the stage of urbanization, Maoist regimes encounter common problems. If there are still people studying Mao Zedong’s works today, I hope they study not only the classical texts but also the common issues faced by all Maoist regimes. Thank you for watching. Episode 1033 ends here. See you Friday.

(First post here; more updates tomorrow.)

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Nepal’s situation is not really easy to explain. The Dahal (Prachar) revisionist group betrayed Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. With the revolutionary army already occupying most of the country (if I recall correctly about 90%, earlier discussions on how to capture the capital), they used the pretext that the monarchy had been abolished and the state had been “democratized.” After ordering the revolutionary army to lay down their weapons, they themselves entered the cabinet as officials, becoming a modern version of Tooriati and Dorji, effectively a comprador within the middle camp. The “socialist multi-party system” is something he invented.

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Public Letter from Indian Communist (Maoist) Criticizing Nepal United Communist (Maoist) )

Janapati cannot hide in Nepal; he resigned precisely because of age and health, going to Nepal would be walking into a trap. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of India (Naxal Maoist) besides him has also another Eastern Regional Bureau secretary. There is no information yet (whether surrender, death in battle, or his whereabouts). Indian reactionaries have reached his family and are eager to persuade him to defect, because that would carry significant political meaning for them.

As for the situation in India, Madhok Singh is parroting the views of the pro-communist (Mao) traitors and Indian reactionary media, portraying the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) as opposing India’s development, being dogmatic and conservative, doomed to fail, etc., thereby cooperating with reactionaries to wage a psychological war, with the aim of wearing down the zeal of communists.

According to reactionary media reports and interviews, De-wu-ji and others surrendered after being captured, rather than surrendering voluntarily out of pessimism, because there were no conditions to convene a Central Committee meeting. In reality, he was not the General Secretary of the CPI (Mao) since that position has been vacant since Basavaraj’s death. Of course, this is not an excuse, because Basavaraj was captured before his death as well, and he was killed after refusing to surrender.

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One of the reactionary government’s counterrevolutionary strategies in India is to selectively kill revolutionaries within the Communist Party of India (Marxist) during suppression, while sparing the surrendered cadres and capitalist-roaders, in an attempt to alter the internal class power balance of the CPI(M). At present, the phenomenon of CPI(M) members and its guerrilla fighters laying down their arms and surrendering has increased, but it is not yet widespread; it is mainly followers of the Sonu-Satish traitor group and a few wavering elements. Finally, the reactionary media in India deliberately avoids reporting the losses of reactionary police and the army, which is also part of a psychological warfare, aiming to create the illusion that the reactionary army is slaughtering revolutionaries on the battlefield unilaterally.

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The views expressed here are essentially a replica of the viewpoints of the Sonu-Subtitle (Sonu-Satish) traitor group, which holds that India’s social relations of production have fundamentally changed, no longer a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, but have already urbanized and capitalist, and that the path of protracted people’s war has no future. They are using this to beautify their acts of betrayal. In the official statement of the CPI(Maoist) it is also mentioned that a few years before Sonu formally surrendered, he submitted his position to the Central Committee, but was rejected. The General Secretary Basavaraj wrote an article titled “The Changes in India’s Production Relations — Our Party’s Program,” apparently to correct this ideological confusion; Sonu, by having his wife, who surrendered before him, arrange a bridge to the Indian reactionaries, while secretly pulling strings within the party to form factions, and finally, after seeing the General Secretary die in battle and with CPI(Mao) probably temporarily unable to dispatch someone to pursue the traitor, directly surrendered along with his accomplices. The post above contains the Chinese translation of CPI(Mao)’s statement.

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Moreover, the official statement of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) has not been released yet, so the news and analysis about Dewuji are not trustworthy; what is circulating online currently are the claims of bourgeois media.

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The prudent attitude in this article is the correct one; regarding the previous large-scale surrender, there is also an unofficial machine translation version of the official statement from the Communist (Mao) on the lower floors.

Ma Qianzuan’s classic productivity-only view says that most people only want to make personal fortune and not resist exploitation; indeed almost every sentence can be refuted. It portrays historical materialism—the idea that social existence determines social consciousness—as “identity politics.” Another issue is that if you don’t discuss class but just glance at Mao’s Selected Works and strike a guerrilla, you become Maoist. Although I hadn’t studied Uganda before, true belief in communism certainly wouldn’t support hereditary rule.

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Crow Censor: “Legends of Uncle Africa: 5 Mao Zedong Selected Works to seize the country, 1 Deng Xuan to govern the world”
An article praising Uganda by the Chinese media, with Uganda participating in the Belt and Road Initiative; suggests a comprador regime molded by China.

It is claimed that relying on Maoist selection to win the presidential throne, erasing the class nature of Chairman Mao’s works, seems to suggest that any role can apply the theory of proletarian revolution, which is a complete insult to proletarian revolutionaries. Chairman Mao’s works are all for the liberation of the proletariat and the working people; how could a reactionary bourgeois intriguer possibly grasp that “the deepest foundation of the power of war lies in the masses,” and how could he dare implement the masses-led approach?

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How should this sentence be interpreted? I feel it should be more like the argument from human nature, portraying people as inherently “self-interested.” Productivity theory doesn’t seem to have much to do with the latter.

Sorry, I didn’t include punctuation. Here I’m referring to two typical problems.

Because I have to go to work and don’t have much time to reply, reading this copy again now, I can almost imagine Ma Du Gong’s smug, patronizing, pompous, and petty expressions. In fact, this video itself also reflects the attitude of the Chinese revisionists toward the recent setbacks of the Communist Party of India (Mao).

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Ma Dougong, this beast is really shameless to the utmost. The Communist Party of India (Marxist), Maoist opposing foreign monopolistic bourgeoisie在国内开工厂, opposing trade agreements with the EU, he says this only protects the interests of smallholders, blocks cheaper food imports, infringes workers’ interests. It is entirely the face of colonizers. Cheap food and industrial goods are dumped in, workers get no benefits. India as a colony would never truly receive cheap industrial goods. Gabon and other African countries are China’s colonies, but prices are higher and higher. Why? Because when these colonizers’ goods are dumped in and fully squeeze out the national bourgeois’ goods, then they will sell their products at monopolistic prices, but local workers will only be further squeezed when prices temporarily fall, and even when prices rise they still get wages that have been reduced. After the national bourgeois is displaced, in order to maintain their exploitative position, they will inevitably further squeeze and exploit workers; even the national bourgeois themselves will be highly dissatisfied with this dumping. When this person Ma Qianzuo speaks, it becomes CPI Mao’s脱离工人, sectarianism, and safeguarding small faction interests. In fact, the influence of the CPI Mao cannot expand, entirely because the Indian government and China, the United States, and Russia—the three imperialist powers supporting India—疯狂封锁 and white terror against CPI Mao. It is precisely because imperialism attaches more and more importance to colonies that it must increasingly suppress revolutionary movements in colonies. Zhongxiu (China’s Reform) is doing this most actively. When Ma Qianzuo talks this line, he wants to be Song Jiang; he wants to prove that Marxism “is outdated,” has failed, and now he wants to partner with that rapper—actually just like him, doing self-media, propagating his reformist line, and then run for office to deceive with reforms. This person’s ambition has always been very great; he previously fantasized about being a high official in some novel like “The Three-Body Problem” (likely a mistranslation of a Chinese sci-fi/ref). He called himself Ma Qianzhu. His reform is actually not reform at all, but that set of “rationalizations.” He himself has said that for an aging society, the state must keep up with the times, get the elderly to work more, and delay retirement. So this person is a genuine beast; he is now accumulating political capital, and in fact Zhongxiu has always been supporting him. He has spoken many so-called “exposures” of Zhongxiu’s faults and was blocked several times, but each time he calmly reemerged and used it as political capital. In the future, this kind of thing will become more and more common, and Marxists must struggle against this kind of thing.

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Actually, the guy Ma Dou Gong is not just attacking the Communist Party of India (Maoist) this time. In the sleep-time report episode 920, he accuses CPI (Maoist) of not breaking with dogmatism, of not developing in the city; he spouts that the urbanization rate is only about 30%, that official unemployment is 9% (counting only men). He calls India a paradise of urbanization, and claims CPI (Maoist) radios were deciphered by Indian comprador computers; CPI (Maoist) purifies (agro-industrializes) its own ranks, cannot break away from the intelligentsia to modernize, and bluntly says CPI (Maoist) soldiers would even look for household slaves, complains that soldiers have fought guerilla warfare for so long, with suppressed personal freedom of thought for so long, etc. Now I’ll paste the disgusting remarks they published in episode 920.

Hello everyone, on Tuesday, July 1, 2025, welcome to the 920th episode of the Sleep Time News, please stay quiet while introducing the topic.

On May 23, 2025, the Indian government announced that in the eastern state of Chhattisgarh, 27 CPI (Maoist) members were killed, including CPI (Maoist) General Secretary Kaśhva Rao. This is the first direct loss of the top leadership of CPI (Maoist) in more than forty years.

After the report, Modi was very excited, saying it marked a major breakthrough in stabilizing domestic security. The Indian official also claimed that by the first quarter of 2026, CPI (Maoist) would be eliminated.

Because of the name, China keeps a close eye on CPI (Maoist). But after more than ten years of government crackdowns, CPI (Maoist) activities and personnel have declined sharply, and the top leadership has now been lost.

In recent years there has been a view that in the drone era, guerilla warfare would have no chance. Is CPI (Maoist) situation related to drone warfare?

In terms of domestic policy, Modi has made many promises, such as creating 10 million jobs and doubling farmers’ incomes, none of which were fulfilled. This time the declaration to eliminate CPI (Maoist) by 2026 is just the usual routine. In any case, whether or not it is done, there will be ways to make others forget the promises.

But Modi is not completely blowing smoke; Indian Maoists are indeed near defeat. Besides the general secretary being killed, in the past six months CPI (Maoist) has lost many senior cadres. Indian media statistics show the Politburo once had 13 members, now only 4 remain; Central Committee also only 14 remain. In the next two to three years, Maoist guerrilla zones may disappear altogether.

Unless India experiences huge turmoil within two years and the state machinery collapses, otherwise Maoists will permanently withdraw from mainstream Indian political competition.

Of course, even if CPI (Maoist) fails completely, it does not mean armed resistance inside India will disappear. The Indian government’s control over base-level areas has always been weak; Indian society in 2025 still generates new sharp contradictions. If CPI (Maoist) abandons guerilla zones, disbands semi-open armed forces, and only leaves underground organizations relying on personal networks, they can survive.

However, as per precedents of other countries’ Trotskyist and related groups, at this stage Maoist presence becomes only symbolic. The CPI (Maoist) urgent tasks would be to hide a few senior members to write party history and leave a lesson from history.

As for the drone strikes on guerillas, there are drone reconnaissance photos released by the Indian government; the official armed forces can now observe guerrilla movements more easily. But the Indian government report and various media investigations do not claim drones have a significant effect.

Looking at other countries’ cases, drones in counter-guerrilla warfare are mainly counterproductive, because reconnaissance drones alone aren’t enough; armed drones can attack remotely but cannot conduct ground checks; neither can replace light infantry patrolling on the ground.

America’s technical level is far above India’s, and in Afghanistan and Iraq drone bombings frequently killed civilians, which only increased popular support for anti-American forces. In earlier years, local Indian police forces also tried to emulate nationalist KMT’s approach, adopting a “shoot first, ask questions later” strategy, which also earned CPI (Maoist) more grass-roots support. This era isn’t the 20th century; indiscriminate slaughter is impossible to conduct domestically, let alone genocide, so drones aren’t the reason CPI (Maoist) failed.

This time the Indian government’s heavy blow to the Maoist last field army, even killing the General Secretary, was ultimately due to real strength crushing. After the central government intervened, the Maoist guerrilla zones saw the army spend unlimited resources, establish numerous strongholds, and win over local residents by bribery and persuasion, pushing Maoists into a dead end.

Before the central Indian army fully intervened, CPI (Maoist) had more than ten years of development opportunities in these guerilla zones. Why did CPI (Maoist) in India always stay in a passive defensive guerilla posture?

The basic background is that the central government’s power greatly exceeded that of the 1930s KMT. But CPI (Maoist)’s strategy also had problems, always failing to break through the dogmatic worldview of the 20th century, thus wasting the already very limited development opportunities.

From the early guerilla stage to now, Maoist core supporters have always come from the hilly tribal peoples of the Deccan Plateau. In the early 21st century, due to growing social contradictions and lack of direct central action, CPI (Maoist) indeed accumulated some strength in the mountains and launched ten-year “victory expansion” movement.

But in terms of results, the mass base and armed forces did not expand significantly; they even lost senior cadres cultivated since the revolution’s early days. Therefore, as long as Indian authorities truly value Maoism, and the central ruling party and local politicians reach a compromise to mobilize resources to suppress it, Maoists will still have to fight with the strength from more than a decade ago, ultimately shrinking their activity zones and eliminating guerrilla forces.

The biggest problem for Indian Maoists is they still hope rural land reform will be the core policy, rural armed struggle will encircle cities and seize power. But in the 21st century, even though India remains a low-income country and rural land issues persist, they are no longer the core contradiction.

Ordinary Indian farmers in the current situation can basically be fed, and they aren’t satisfied with a small parcel of land to solve subsistence; they need to move to cities to obtain modern life. At the same time, India’s urban development level far surpasses China’s Republican era; not only a consumer hub and a distribution center for foreign goods, but also possesses enough productive capacity to overwhelm rural mobilization. So, if CPI (Maoist) wants to break through, the only hope is to gather the first batch of forces in the countryside and quickly transform toward urban movement, gaining the support of the urban middle class and mobilizing a portion of the city economy.

However, from limited data, CPI (Maoist) has strictly adhered to the 20th century Chinese successful experience, repeatedly pursuing a full-scale land revolution. The result is not only failed armed struggle but also turning itself into a minor party politically. India’s current political arena is not lacking in minor parties; the Maoists’ main difference from these “peers” is not a more advanced guiding ideology, but that they have their own guerilla in inland mountain areas. Now with the main guerrilla force crushed, CPI (Maoist) and their “peers” are coming closer and closer to them.

Dugo, why do you think CPI (Maoist) has such serious dogmatism? How did this party gain nationwide influence in the past?

Here is a quotation from Mao Zedong:

e Where does correct thought come from? Does it fall from the sky? No. Is it inherent in the mind? No. Correct thought can only come from social practice, only from three kinds of practice: the struggles of productive forces and the class struggle, and scientific experimentation.

There is no all-knowing, all-powerful genius in the world, nor such an organization. Some organizations can make more active practical explorations, and adjust their strategies based on feedback. The CPI (Maoist) back then also achieved some successes in this way.

The full name of Indian Maoists is Indian Communist Party (Maoism). From the name you can see this org split from the Indian Communist Party. In India, the “Indian Communist” split into more than ten parties and groups, only fewer than the Congress.

However, because India is far from the Cold War frontlines, suppression isn’t as severe, and Communist support doesn’t need to align explicitly with the Soviet bloc. So these splits objectively did not harm the development of communist organizations. On the contrary, they provided more trial-and-error opportunities, yielding enough practical feedback, and eventually led to the Maoist mountain land revolution attempt.

The Indian Communist Party was established in 1925, initially following the Comintern. According to Mao Zedong, “there are no factions within the party, all sorts of odd ideas”; at that time the Indian Communist Party was unified, but internally there were different theoretical factions. Some factions supported legal struggle, some supported armed revolution. But India at the time was still a colony, with the big goal of opposing British rule; internal factions managed to cooperate and strive for independence.

The CPI not only suppressed internal differences, but also actively cooperated with other parties externally. For example, the Indian National Congress led by Gandhi and Nehru, despite ideological clashes with CPI, still formed a cooperative relationship. Before and after Japan’s surrender in 1945-46, the last travel plan of the INC’s former president Chandarl Bhos was to borrow a Japanese transport plane to the Soviet Union to demand support for Indian independence. In 1946, when the Royal Indian Navy mutiny occurred, the mutineers also raised the flags of Congress and CPI. It was this mutiny that made the British government decide to give up on India.

At that time CPI also supported the land revolution route. In 1946, under CPI organization, peasants in the Telangana region of southern India rose in rebellion against feudal landlords and oppression by zamindars and tax collectors. This was the largest peasant uprising under British rule. The rebellion lasted three years, and the peasant communes controlled nearly 4,000 villages, occupying most of Telangana’s rural areas.

After India’s independence in 1947, local feudal lords were unwilling to join India and desired an independent nation. Thus in 1948, the Indian government dispatched troops to attack. Nehru justified sending troops by saying that the Telangana peasant uprising showed that feudal landlords could not represent the local people, and that farmers demanding land would be the future nation’s citizens.

When India was determined to be independent, the CPI split began. Nehru used leftist adventurism to expel General Secretary Ră nād a † av, and negotiated with Nehru. In October 1951, after Nehru promised amnesty for the insurgents, the CPI central committee ordered the end of the uprising.

The CPI’s compromise on land reform planted internal threats. At that time the CPI did not split, largely due to Nehru’s personal influence. Nehru made major contributions to Indian independence, second only to Gandhi.

In such an atmosphere, the Indian Communist Party’s anti-Nehru factions found it hard to gain support. The CPI nationwide had to stay tightly knit to compete with Congress.

In the early years after independence, Nehru’s political character was not yet to openly conduct political purges. So the CPI preferred reformist routes. In 1957, CPI won in Kerala, formed state government, first time breaking Congress rule locally, but the two could coexist peacefully.

The first outbreak of internal CPI tensions was due to divisions within the socialist camp. In 1960, Sino-Soviet split caused fierce disputes on many ideological fronts. The CPI right wing supported the Soviet Union, seeing reform as fine; the CPI left supported China, arguing for radical means to push social change. The two sides split, even openly accusing each other. As China-India relations worsened, CPI right started labeling the left as Chinese agents.

In 1962, the Sino-Indian border war broke out, and India’s defeat damaged Nehru’s prestige. Nehru also abandoned his respectable political style, arresting many CPI left members, with the pretext of colluding with China. There were rumors that the pro-Soviet CPI leadership gave Nehru a list to kill with his dagger.

After these rumors, internal political trust in CPI collapsed. In 1964, CPI formally split; the pro-China left became CPI (M) — Indian Communist Party (Marxist). The pro-Soviet right inherited the original CPI name and structure.

The split CPI (M) (Marxist) was the strongest among many factions for years, later absorbing CPI’s main supporters. West Bengal governed by CPI (M) for about thirty years. In present-day Kerala and Manipur, CPI (M) remains major ruling party.

In 1969, CPI (M) split again. The conflict occurred in West Bengal’s Nadia district, where the Naxalite movement started, a peasant anti-rent and land-redistribution movement. Many viewers know that Maoist parties in South Asia, including Indian Maoists, have a nickname called Naxal. This alias comes from the Nadia uprising.

After independence, although land reform occurred and the zamindari system was abolished, land ownership didn’t change much. The traditional landlord-bourgeoisie class still owned most land and held most local government posts. Official data show powerful landlords can be seen as feudal lords, fully controlling the local peasants. Peasants paid rents and high-interest loans, performed corvée labor, and endured exploitation.

In the 1960s, rural India’s class tensions might have been stronger than China’s pre-land reform. But India’s national composition and religions are complex; along with the caste system unique to South Asia, it was hard to form a strong class coalition. For instance, the Nadia uprising’s base was mostly from original tribes, with low status and a majority being from lower castes; while the landlords were mostly from the high castes dating back to the Mughal era. Therefore, simple class conflict tended to skew into caste conflict.

Congress admitted that landlord oppression triggered the Naxal uprising, but it was brutally suppressed. Across the country, including West Bengal, there wasn’t much sympathy for Naxal peasants.

This uprising placed CPI (M) in a difficult position. The same year it rose to power in West Bengal, governing with the state’s government; maintaining governance of a large province like West Bengal was crucial to CPI (M). The mainstream CPI (M) refrained from violent uprisings, while the insurgent leadership came from CPI (M) radicals. The mainstream tried to suppress while persuading radicals to back down. For radicals, after more than twenty years of restraint in order to prioritize the big picture, it was time to reform land.

When CPI (M) found itself stuck between retreat and advance, Congress disbanded West Bengal’s government and arrested CPI (M) members there. The mainstream CPI (M) seemed to have barely won their gains, but radicals dragged them into a dilemma. The mainstream believed the leaders cared only about holding office, not unity. In 1969, CPI (M) split again, with radicals forming the Indian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), or CPI (M-L).

In the following years, CPI (M-L) split many times, producing many factions; CPI-M and Maoist elements gradually disappeared from mainstream politics. Indian media began using the term “Maoist” to refer to this branch’s various small groups.

Although rooted in peasant uprisings, the Maoists did not rapidly develop in India at that time. Stimulated by the Nadia uprising, the Indian government finally paid attention to agricultural issues. By the late 1960s-early 1970s, Indian agriculture entered a period of rapid development; after more than a decade of growth, grain production doubled. India even transformed from a major grain importer to one of the grain exporters. Although per-capita grain production remained low, under tropical climate it largely eliminated famine.

Meanwhile, government-led land reform also progressed. For example, in West Bengal, starting in 1977 CPI (M) promoted land reform, expropriating surplus land for redistribution and using laws to protect tenant farmers.

So during this period, CPI Maoist failed to gain much support, staying on the political margins for more than twenty years, mostly spent arguing with each other. Until neighboring Nepal sparked a land revolution.

In the late 1990s, CPI Maoist gained support in Nepal after the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) adopted the Maoist banner, moving into remote districts and declaring a rural encirclement of cities to overthrow the monarchy. Within a few years, Nepal’s Maoist insurgency swept the country.

The enemy was strong, but the royal family also provided Maoists with an assist. In 2001, the Nepal royal family’s strange massacre occurred; the Crown Prince killed the entire family, leaving only the King’s brother Janendra. Janendra’s ascent to the throne led to the abolition of the constitutional monarchy and the return to monarchic rule. This oppression provoked major political forces in Nepal to oppose the monarchy and align with the Maoists. In 2006, under pressure from both domestic and international forces, Janendra abdicated, ending Nepal’s civil war. The Maoists gained a legal status and became one of the three major parties, often governing in coalition.

Nepal’s Maoist rise gave Indian Maoists hope, prompting them to stop infighting. In 2004, two large Indian Maoist factions merged to form the Indian Communist Party (Maoist). Today when we say Indian Maoists, we usually mean this organization.

In the following years, Indian Maoists rapidly developed in inland areas. Around 2010, their strength peaked with several tens of thousands of armed fighters, with activity spanning roughly one-third of Indian territory.

The Maoists’ latest victory was not due to intensified feudal land conflicts, but to upheavals in India’s economic development that created capitalist tensions. From independence to the 1990s, India’s land reform and agricultural technology development kept social structure relatively stable. After the 1990s, with the Soviet Union’s decline, India shifted toward economic liberalization, widening gaps between rich and poor. In some respects, early-2000s India resembles 1990s China.

For example, central and eastern Maoist strongholds sit in areas rich in minerals and timber. Since the 1990s these areas have welcomed rapid development, but most benefits went to consortia and magnates. Local ordinary residents did not see significant income rises; public lands were encroached and environmental pollution worsened, creating strong antagonism.

The most affected were indigenous people. As mentioned earlier, in India, indigenous people’s status is akin to that of Dalits, living in tribal forms with low economic development. In the early 21st century their infant mortality was about 38 per thousand, many times India’s average. They had little political representation and limited chances to influence policy through elections. This formed the main social base for Maoist guerrillas, who needed soldiers and food.

Mao Zedong wrote in 1928 a paper titled Why Were China’s Red Authorities Able to Exist? The first reason was that imperialist and comprador landlord classes supported various warlords; since the founding of the Republic of China, war among these factions continued, a feature of semi-colonial China.

Our conclusion: as long as the red authorities face continued war within the country, their emergence, existence, and development will be inevitable.

India’s situation at that time was similar to 1928 China. The central government focused on urban issues, not rural guerillas. Provincial and district governments were often in conflict with the center, not willing to support each other. So Maoist guerrillas could survive by dealing with local landlords’ guards, defeating local police, and gradually expanding guerrilla zones.

By 2006, Indian Prime Minister Singh proclaimed that Indian Maoists had become India’s biggest “security threat.” After three years of bickering, local governments finally allowed central troops to operate in the states and partake in the crackdown. This is again similar to how Chiang Kai-shek’s government took the offensive against local warlords after 1932, against the Jiangxi and Dabie mountain areas.

Once the Indian central armed forces joined the fight, Maoist guerrilla zones began to shrink. After Modi took office in 2014, the crackdown intensified. For instance, in Chhattisgarh, Modi’s government deployed more than 60,000 security personnel. At the same time, Modi’s government used the fruits of years of economic development to build infrastructure there, and recruit Maoists by offering incentives to surrender. After more than a decade of military and economic pressure, Maoist guerrilla forces have reached today’s impasse.

Looking at several decades of history, various factions of the Indian Communist Party have participated in multiple land-reform movements. After each downturn, a new eruption occurred twenty or thirty years later. Dugo, why do you think CPI (Maoist) has now reached an impasse?

Because times have changed. India may see future revolutions in other forms, but certainly not a revolution mobilized by land reform and peasant self-cultivation, nor a replication of the 20th-century Chinese land revolution. Whether by CPI (Maoist)’s own standards or by the general way of history, India in the future will not have a “Maoist Revolution.” So I say Maoism has reached a dead end.

Specifically, three aspects of modern changes have affected land reform:

The first aspect is modern urbanization.
In the 20th century, when China launched land reform, there were two types of cities. One was the industrial-era industrial-commercial city like Paris or Manchester; the other was the agricultural-era regional center like Xi’an or Chengdu.
Agricultural society still had some handicrafts in cities, but overall it was a consumer city depending on surrounding rural areas for surplus grain and labor. Rural areas could provide most of the necessities themselves, so rural areas could encircle cities, and cities could not completely suppress rural areas.
The industrial society changed this relationship. Rural handicrafts largely disappeared, textile industry industrialized. Even farming relied on fertilizers, seeds, agricultural machinery from urban industry; fuels; and finally railways to move surplus grain. Thus, industrial society requires mutual dependence of city and countryside; rural dependence on cities is greater. Only cities can lead rural areas, not rural encircling cities.
Now India’s medium-to-large cities, compared to China and the U.S., are not sufficiently developed. But India has world’s third-largest power generation, already far surpassing Russia. Therefore, India’s urbanization cannot be treated as a regional center of an agricultural era. Those who want to wage a rural-encircling-cities revolution in India will mostly trap themselves in the countryside.

The second change is that the international situation has generally become more peaceful.
In the early 20th century, the major events were the two world wars. Great powers that participated in or were invaded did not use most resources for internal stability. Also, the Soviet Union, as a latecomer in the ideological competition, was willing to spend huge resources to support revolutions abroad, which produced successful land-reform cases in China, Vietnam, and others.
There was no world war in the 21st century; India and Pakistan still quarrel, but both sides have drawn a line, not annexing each other’s formal territory, avoiding unmanageable population moves. So India can mobilize its main army to suppress internally, and land reform cannot rise to occupying major cities.

The third change is the advancement of computer technology.
In the 20th century, land reform to build a modern state depended on radio technology. Because peasants’ spontaneous actions were inherently conservative, sophisticated ideology was needed to guide, plus frequent party activity to enforce discipline, to surpass thousands of years of peasant uprisings. Early peasant uprisings were distributed in inaccessible mountainous areas, and advancing beyond these constraints required modern communication technology so that the revolutionary army could coordinate and supervise each other.
Telegraphs and telephones could transmit information, but a fatal weakness was fixed lines. The enemy would not allow the Red Army to build communications trunks in accessible areas and would damage the base district’s communications network. Rural guerrilla tactics would be to retreat when the enemy advances, advance when the enemy retreats; they could not protect fixed lines, so they relied on radio to keep mutual contact and maintain modernity. In every battle log, besides weapons, the Maoist guerrillas’ main equipment is radio equipment.

In the early 20th century there were no computers, deciphering fixed codebooks was a long job. Most armies could just change codebooks regularly to ensure communications safety. So at that time, the best approach for rural revolution was to disperse, accumulate power in mountains slowly.
In the mid-20th century information theory emerged and then computers. Therefore deciphering codes and removing noise became one and the same. As long as intercepted used code communications could be captured many times, powerful computers could decode encrypted messages. Now, with great powers opposing each other, there is no obvious gap in computing power, and the code war can be basically equal. Great powers dealing with their own guerrillas can completely render radio communications one-way transparent. This may be the most important technical factor enabling India to eliminate mountainous guerrillas, more important than drones.

The three changes—urbanization, a generally peaceful international environment, and computing power—work together to render the 20th-century land-reform experience nearly impossible to repeat in great-power contexts. Only in Nepal-like weak, underdeveloped countries do Maoists have a chance to seize national power. In India, Maoist struggle for 20 years could only establish guerrilla zones in the mountains, never a permanent base, which is not due to their incompetence but due to changes in historical rules.

If the traditional peasant movement could not go far inland, they could maintain the status quo, or convert locally into a regular feudal regime. For example, the Sichuan-Chongqing regime in the border area between the east and west Jin dynasties could survive for decades on surrounding mountainous areas. But this law does not apply to modern revolutionary movements. The modern nature of revolution cannot be supplemented by the rural. The stagnation of land reform will inevitably lead to rapid failure.

Specifically, peasant participation in land reform has strong class limitations; if revolution strategies are entirely based on peasant demands, the revolution will quickly fail. The August Failure during the Jinggangshan period was caused by湖南 peasants’ soldiers’ regional tendencies and roving bandit tendencies. Later the Red Army continuously recruited cadres from cities, and military and peasant forces intermingled; only then did they establish the Southern Soviet base areas. After the Red Army reached Yan’an, for a long time it occupied only seven or eight poor counties; finances were extremely tight, and it immediately began drafting educated youths from cities, fearing losing their modernity.

The problem with Indian Maoists is that in a society that is already fully urbanized, and in a city-driven economy, it is hard to attract urban youth to rural paths. Guerrilla forces are rooted in far-flung mountains for long periods, never occupying medium-sized cities, and even forming a current tendency to resist urban life’s purity. So Maoist armed forces are structurally regressing: top leadership comes from urban high-caste backgrounds, while the lower ranks are late-joiners from peasant cadres. This is not an intentional design, but objectively undermines the army’s political governance, counteracting the revolution’s greatest advantage.

Also, Chinese revolutionary experience shows land reform can only mobilize briefly; long-term sustainability requires economic and human resources. Because land redistribution policies are easiest in poor mountainous areas and popular in hungry rural areas, yet as landowners become peasants, their economic options are to feed the family, reducing willingness to join the army. Surplus grain and manpower for the army become tight.

In the Chinese Civil War period, the army could obtain supplies through external campaigns and replenish manpower with prisoners, so tensions were not obvious. Indian Maoists cannot fight large-scale battles in densely populated areas. After land reform, they would still face rural mobilization decline.

Finally, the revolutionary forces themselves will also age. Both administrative cadres and revolutionary soldiers are ordinary people who marry and raise children. Once families form, this becomes a liability, affecting marching speed and even preventing long-distance operations.

China’s experience shows first keep families in the base areas to protect them; the army acts independently. Second, for unmarried soldiers, strictly limit marriage and arrange marriages after victory. These two lessons do not apply to Indian Maoists either, because CPI (Maoist) only has mobile guerrilla zones, with no single base under their control.

From 2006 to 2025, they have fought for 19 years; the early cadres and soldiers will inevitably consider personal matters. If discipline is strictly enforced, it could drive soldiers to desert. A forgiveness gesture by Modi in recent years can attract a batch of Maoist soldiers to surrender. The long-term suppression of personal life is also a major factor.

All these adverse factors combine, and Indian Maoists cannot even consider national victory; they have no option but to fade. So I think that after this headquarters and the largest guerrilla force are destroyed, Indian Maoists can hardly rebuild their power.

For Chinese readers, India and Nepal’s Maoist guerrillas, and South Asia Maoist guerilla groups are new phenomena that appeared in the internet era. The first person to introduce Nepalese Maoist armed forces in Simplified Chinese online was a college friend of mine; I still recall his article titled The Red Flag on the World’s Roof. At that time I was shocked by how quickly Nepal’s Maoist forces developed, unable to speak. Looking back at the entire South Asian Maoist revolutionary war, I still feel shocked and respectful.

Whether it is Indian Maoists or Nepal’s Maoists, the weapons in their hands and the experiences in their minds are tools of 20th-century backwardness. But after paying tens of thousands of lives, they still managed to find application spaces for these backward tools in the 21st century, establishing broad guerrilla zones—an impressive achievement.

However, since they call themselves Mao Zedong’s successors, they should understand: Mao Zedong’s victory wasn’t because of a lucky discovery of a magical book containing a complete plan for land revolution. Mao used materialist historical laws, through practice, in a particular East Asian environment, to explore the most feasible land revolution program from scratch.

The same plan under different social conditions may not work. If Mao Zedong were reincarnated and given time to learn and practice, even Mao Zedong wouldn’t simply repeat the 20th-century plan. If others try to push his line to its end and expect the same results, it is even less likely. So I say Indian Maoists have dogmatism problems that have eliminated any hope of preserving revolutionary achievements.

Analyzing Indian Maoists with class analysis, dogmatism is somewhat over-applauding them. As mentioned earlier, in the relatively clear feudal order of the 20th century, Maoist movements did not flourish. But in the 21st century, when Indian capitalism fully developed, Maoists established large-scale guerrilla zones. In the past decade or so, the rural contradictions Maoists exploited resemble China’s feudal society in form, but the social structure is completely different.

Therefore, applying rural guerrilla warfare strategies in certain parts of India is correct, but pursuing a full-scale land revolution nationwide is like being worried about riding a bicycle in rain and needing to buy a boat to go to work; you will end up stuck in a puddle at the door.

Chairman Mao said correct thoughts do not fall from the sky; dogmatic thinking and other incorrect thoughts do not fall from the sky either. People are all the same; you can’t say Indians are stupid and can’t grasp Mao’s depth of thought. I think the biggest problem is that the foundation of land reform has ebbed away; Indian revolutionaries cannot replicate the Red Army’s flowering everywhere in the past. With ongoing stagnation in every local area, maintaining personal worship of Mao and clinging to his proposed solutions may be the least bad way to preserve internal unity.

This again proves from practice that the era of land reform is over. Revolutionaries must understand new social bases in the urbanization and information age, and use new social contradictions to push history forward. To locate and solve new social contradictions, whether Mao Zedong, or Marx, Engels, Lenin—even their enemies—

All people’s ways of thinking are worth learning, and all their specific conclusions are only for reference.

This is the correct choice for future revolutionaries.

Thank you all for watching—episode 920 ends here. See you Friday!

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While looking for preemptive knights to attack the Communist Party of India (Maoist), I also found an article praising China during the socialist period for India’s revolution. Let’s look at the dramatic differences between the two:

India’s Spring Thunder

With a deafening spring thunder, it shook India’s land. In the Darjeeling area of India, revolutionary peasants rose up in rebellion. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) Revolutionary Wing, a red region of rural revolutionary armed struggle was born in India! This marks a major development in the Indian people’s revolutionary struggle. In the past months, the peasant masses in Darjeeling, under the CPI (Maoist) Revolutionary Wing, shattered the shackles of modern revisionism, broke through all nets that bound them, and seized grain, land, and guns from landlords and plantation owners; punished the tyrants, ambushed the reactionary troops and police that tried to advance, demonstrating the immense power of peasant revolutionary armed struggle. What imperialism? What revisionism? What corrupt officials and landlords? What reactionary armies and police? They are all not in the vision of the revolutionary peasants; they will all be kicked down and crushed. The CPI (Maoist) Revolutionary Wing did right and well! The Chinese people warmly cheered for the peasant revolution in Darjeeling. All Marxists-Leninists and revolutionary people around the world cheered loudly for the Darjeeling peasant revolution.

The Indian peasants rise to rebel, the Indian people rise to revolution; it is inevitable, forced by the reactionary rule of the Indian National Congress. Under Congress rule, India, while nominally independent, remains a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society. The Congress government represents the interests of feudal princes, big landlords, and bureaucratic comprador capitalists. It cruelly oppresses and exploites the Indian people domestically, and internationally continues to rely on the former suzerain Britain, while also courting new masters—American imperialism and its chief accomplice the Soviet revisionists. Thus imperialism, Soviet revisionism, feudalism, and bureaucratic comprador capitalism press heavily on the broad masses, especially the workers and peasants. In recent years, the Congress government has intensified repression and exploitation, pursued a sellout policy, causing repeated famines and widespread corpses. The Indian people can no longer endure, particularly India’s vast peasantry. Now, the revolutionary peasants of Darjeeling have finally risen to rebel, to wage violent revolution. This is the vanguard of millions of Indians rising to violence. The Indian people will surely overthrow these mountains and fully reverse their fate. This is the general trend of Indian history—inevitable and unstoppable.

What path should the Indian revolution take? This is the fundamental question concerning victory or defeat, and it concerns the fate of five hundred million Indian people. The Indian revolution must rely on the peasantry, establish rural bases, persevere in protracted armed struggle, surround the cities from the countryside, and ultimately capture cities. This is Mao Zedong’s path, the victorious path walked by the Chinese revolution, and the only road to victory for all oppressed peoples and oppressed nations.

Our great leader Chairman Mao, as early as forty years ago, pointed out: “Hundreds of millions of peasants have risen from central, southern, and northern China; their momentum is like a violent storm, extremely swift, and no force can hold it down. They will cut through all nets binding them and rush along the path of liberation. All imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, and landlords and tyrants will be buried in their graves.”

Chairman Mao has long clearly stressed the extremely important role of the peasant question in people’s revolution. The peasants are the main force in the national democratic revolution against imperialism and its running dogs, and the most reliable and broadest ally of the proletariat. India is a vast country with five hundred million people in a semi-colonial, semi-feudal system, and peasants constitute the overwhelming majority of the population. Once hundreds of millions of Indian peasants are mobilized, an invincible force for Indian revolution will be formed. When the Indian proletariat unites with hundreds of millions of peasants, it can trigger a天翻地覆) upheaval in India’s vast rural areas, and through a spectacular people’s war, defeat any powerful enemy.

Our great leader Chairman Mao teaches: “The central task and the supreme form of revolution is to seize power by armed force, to solve problems through war. This principle of Marxism-Leninism is universally valid, whether in China or in foreign lands; it is valid everywhere.”

The characteristics of the Indian revolution, like those of the Chinese revolution, are an armed revolution against armed counterrevolution. The path of armed struggle is the only correct path for India’s revolution; there is no other path. Concepts like “Gandhi’s peaceful path” or the “parliamentary road” are all opium that the Indian ruling class uses to intoxicate the Indian people. Only by relying on violent revolution and marching the path of armed struggle can India be saved and the Indian people achieve complete liberation. Specifically, this means mobilizing the peasant masses, building and expanding revolutionary armed forces, and using the strategic and tactical toolkit Mao Zedong personally crafted for people’s war to counter the temporary superiority of imperialism and reactionaries with armed suppression, persisting in protracted armed struggle, and step by step taking the path to revolutionary victory.

Our great leader Chairman Mao, in accordance with China’s revolutionary characteristics, emphasized the importance of establishing rural revolutionary bases. Mao taught: to persist in protracted armed struggle and defeat imperialism and its running dogs, “we must transform backward rural areas into advanced, solid bases—militarily, politically, economically, and culturally—so as to oppose the vicious enemies who attack from the cities against rural areas, and to gradually win the full victory of the revolution through long-term combat.”

India is vast, and its vast countryside is the weak link of reactionary rule, a broad space for revolutionaries to roam. As long as India’s proletarian revolutionary faction坚持 Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought’s revolutionary line, relying on the peasant army as a great allied force, there is every condition to establish one advanced rural revolutionary base after another in India’s backward countryside, building a new type of people’s army. Such bases, no matter how many difficulties and twists they encounter, will inevitably develop from point to area, from small pieces to large swaths, in a wave-like fashion. Thus, India’s revolution can gradually form a rural strategy to surround the cities, paving the way to finally seize the cities and achieve nationwide victory.

The development of the Darjeeling rural armed struggle has frightened India’s reactionaries into panic, they feel disaster is near. They cry that the Darjeeling peasant uprising “will become a national disaster.” Imperialists and Indian reactionaries are doing everything possible to crush the Darjeeling peasant armed struggle, trying to kill it in the cradle. The Danji traitor faction and a small group of CPI (Maoist) revisionist leaders are busily slandering and attacking the CPI (Maoist) Revolutionary Wing and the Darjeeling revolutionary peasants’ great feats. The so-called “Non-Congress Government” of West Bengal openly collaborates with Indian reactionaries to conduct bloody repression against Darjeeling’s revolutionary peasants. This only proves that these traitors and revisionists are running dogs of American imperialism and Soviet revisionism, and slaves of India’s big landlords and big capitalists; the so-called “Non-Congress Government” is merely a tool of India’s big landlords and big capitalists.

However, no matter how imperialism, Indian reactionaries, and modern revisionism conspire to disrupt and repress, the CPI (Maoist) Revolutionary Wing and the Darjeeling revolutionary peasants’ fire of armed struggle cannot be extinguished. “A single spark can start a prairie fire.” The Darjeeling spark will blaze across the whole of India, and must blaze. A great storm of revolutionary armed struggle sweeping across India will come, and it will come! Although the path of India’s revolution is long and winding, under the guidance of glorious Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, India’s revolution will surely achieve final victory.

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