After reading Comrade yohaku’s “The Educational Revolution Has Yet to Succeed,” I want to discuss specifically the view of the Cultural Revolution reflected in the post, and the common ground and differences between that view and the understanding our association has developed so far.
I think this comparison is meaningful because both sides affirm the revolutionary significance of the Cultural Revolution, and both oppose understanding revolution as a mere change of political power. But if we follow each line of argument further, we find that the theoretical focus of our respective understandings of the Cultural Revolution is not entirely the same.
I. We both oppose understanding revolution as a mere change of political power
There is a very important line in Comrade yohaku’s article:
A “revolution” that cannot change the relationships between people is nothing more than a coup d’état.
This has much in common with our association’s understanding of socialist revolution and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
If a revolution merely replaces the old government and swaps the people at the top for another group who call themselves revolutionaries, while the old social division of labor, hierarchical relationships, privileges based on knowledge, and relations of domination between people remain unchanged, then that revolution has certainly not been completed.
So both sides see the Cultural Revolution as a revolution that reaches deep into everyday social relationships, not merely as an event in high-level politics.
Comrade yohaku focuses on the hierarchical relationships between teachers and students, experts and laypeople, authorities and ordinary people, and high-achieving students and “poor students.” He argues that schools use the power to assess grades and award credits, the system of advancement to higher education, and competition in examinations to designate some people as “outstanding” and others as “people with no prospects”; and that this hierarchy is not confined to schools but is part of the values of society as a whole.
Our association likewise opposes these hierarchical relationships. We have also long held that socialist revolution cannot merely change the nominal ownership of the means of production. It must continue to change the distinctions inherited from the old society between mental and manual labor, cadres and the masses, and town and countryside, as well as the hierarchical ideas arising from those distinctions.
Thus, neither side would understand the so-called “educational revolution” as simply revising textbooks, changing the form of examinations, or replacing one group of teachers with another. Instead, we would ask: Who, exactly, controls knowledge? Who holds the power of evaluation? Can knowledge and official positions be converted into personal social privilege?
This is an important point of common ground between us.
II. We also both oppose the path of left-wing intellectuals who “climb the ladder for the sake of revolution”
I think Comrade yohaku’s criticism of the Japanese Communist Party and, later, parts of the New Left bears a clear resemblance to the problem of “intellectual capital” that we have long criticized.
As he summarizes it, some left-wing young people still accepted the old society’s standards of success. They could talk about revolution while working hard to enter prestigious universities, major corporations, bureaucratic institutions, the legal profession, and academia, and then believe that once they became professors, bureaucrats, or experts, they would be better able to “work for the revolution.”
In this way, revolution did not change their own paths in life. Instead, it became a reason for them to climb the hierarchy of the old society.
The “intellectual capital” our association has criticized in the past also encompasses this problem.
We do not think knowledge itself is bad, still less that the less a person knows, the more revolutionary they are. What we oppose is a person turning the theory, technical skills, academic credentials, writing ability, and organizational experience they possess into personal capital, then using those things to gain a position above ordinary workers in exchange for a more comfortable life, greater authority, and greater separation from the masses.
Thus, both sides oppose this phenomenon:
Opposing capitalism’s hierarchy in words while, in practice, desperately trying to become part of its upper ranks.
This is also why we both believe that revolution cannot be merely a change in political views; it must also involve changes in ways of life and relationships between people.
III. But our starting points for understanding the Cultural Revolution are not entirely the same
Here a fairly clear difference begins to emerge.
The central thread of Comrade yohaku’s article is “hierarchism.”
In his account, one very important aspect of the Cultural Revolution is that it was “a revolt by those deemed incapable against hierarchism.”
The article therefore repeatedly uses contrasts such as these: “poor students” and high-achieving students; failures and successes; laypeople and experts; ordinary people and authorities; students and teachers.
From this perspective, the Cultural Revolution was an uprising by those held down in the social hierarchy against the authorities who determined their fate. While our association likewise takes these phenomena seriously, we would not take “poor students rebelling against high-achieving students” or “laypeople rebelling against experts” as the starting point of class analysis in itself. This method of analysis tends, in fact, to depart from class analysis and takes on an anarchist character.
What we emphasize more is: Why does socialist society continue to produce new hierarchical relationships? And why might those relationships give rise to a bourgeoisie anew?
Our answer centers mainly on the bourgeois right and the various social distinctions that continue to exist in socialist society.
Distinctions between mental and manual labor, between cadres and the masses, and between managers and those they manage still exist. Knowledge, technical skills, and official positions can still bring different conditions of distribution and social standing. Under such conditions, knowledge, positions, managerial authority, and social connections can all gradually become special resources held by individuals.
So, in our understanding, the Cultural Revolution was not simply a “revolution against hierarchy” in a general sense. It was a practice of continuing class struggle under socialism, restricting bourgeois right, and preventing the formation of new bourgeois relations.
This leads the two sides to understand the same phenomenon differently.
For example, when faced with “experts suppressing ordinary people,” Comrade yohaku sees first the inequality between authorities and ordinary people. We would ask further:
Why can the knowledge this expert possesses be converted into power over the masses? Has this knowledge already become personal capital? What social division of labor and organizational relationships produce this privilege?
IV. Being “oppressed” does not automatically mean holding a “proletarian standpoint”
This is another important difference between the two sides.
Comrade yohaku is deeply concerned with those whom schools judge to be “no good,” a concern that runs through the entire article. At the end, he even describes the Cultural Revolution as a kind of love that asks nothing in return for “children with poor grades.”
We can understand why he puts it this way. But from the standpoint of our association’s class analysis, being “held down” does not, by itself, directly establish a person’s class standpoint.
A person may be a poor student, may have failed the college entrance examination, may lack academic credentials, may be looked down on by experts, or may be oppressed at school. But none of these things in themselves guarantees that the person will develop a proletarian worldview as a result.
Oppressed people may likewise seek to get rich or rise above others, and they may hope to become new authorities themselves one day.
Conversely, someone with extensive specialized knowledge does not automatically become bourgeois simply by virtue of possessing that knowledge.
Thus, what we oppose is not “people with knowledge” but intellectual capital and the idea of private ownership of knowledge; not the specialized division of labor itself, but propertied-class intellectuals using specialized knowledge to gain privileges that separate them from the masses.
From this starting point, our view is: Oppose intellectual capital, not knowledge; oppose rule by experts, not specialized knowledge; oppose the “white and expert” path, rather than treating “not knowing how to do anything” as revolutionary in itself.
This is also why we believe the Cultural Revolution must be combined with proletarianization.
V. Our understanding of “ideological struggle” goes further than simply opposing authority
Comrade yohaku criticizes Liu Shaoqi-style “self-cultivation,” as well as the Japanese left’s understanding of revolution as a process of individual study, individual awakening, and individual advancement.
This accords with our opposition to theories of individual self-cultivation divorced from actual class struggle.
But we do not therefore reject ideological remolding itself.
On the contrary, our association has consistently emphasized ideological struggle.
The question is not “whether to remold oneself” but how one remolds oneself.
If so-called ideological remolding consists merely of a person shutting themselves away to read, reflect, and improve their moral cultivation, training themselves to become a “revolutionary” more noble than others, then it remains a form of petty-bourgeois individual self-cultivation.
The ideological struggle we speak of must take place within actual class practice.
A person’s individualism, hierarchical thinking, belief in the private ownership of knowledge, desire for comfort and enjoyment and for getting something without working for it, fear of taking responsibility, and tendency to vulgarize relationships between comrades—none of these problems arises in the study, and none can be resolved through reflection in the study alone.
They must be exposed through labor, mass work, organizational life, actual revolutionary tasks, and criticism and self-criticism, and then transformed through collective struggle.
So, as we understand it, ideological struggle is not just resistance to oppression by others. It also includes continually asking oneself: Am I also seeking to become a new authority?
A student’s resistance to a teacher’s authority today does not guarantee that the student will not seek to become a professor tomorrow. A young person’s resistance to bureaucrats today does not guarantee that, after gaining an official position, they will not become a new bureaucrat. A person’s opposition to experts’ privileges today does not guarantee that, after acquiring more theoretical knowledge, they will not turn theory into their own intellectual capital.
Thus, in our view, the Cultural Revolution is not only a struggle waged by the masses against old authorities; it is also a struggle in which revolutionaries continually confront the class habits of the old society within themselves. We believe the more important questions are: What conditions continually reproduce capitalist relations? How can those conditions be restricted and eliminated?
VI. This leads to a further difference in the importance we attach to “proletarianization”
In this article by Comrade yohaku, “proletarianization” is not a particularly prominent concept.
The article mainly discusses rebellion, opposition to hierarchy and expert authority, and changing social values.
For our association, by contrast, proletarianization is precisely a central issue connecting the Cultural Revolution with ideological struggle.
By proletarianization, we do not mean simply sending intellectuals to work in factories for a few months, still less that taking part in manual labor will automatically improve a person’s thinking.
If a person works every day but cares only about wages, technical proficiency, and their own comfortable life, and has no interest in the struggles of the masses, organizational life, or revolutionary tasks, then labor in itself will not automatically change their worldview.
Proletarianization means a change in a person’s entire way of social life.
Intellectuals must enter into labor and the life of the masses over the long term, making the knowledge they possess available for collective use. They must change the path in life of relying on knowledge, academic credentials, and technical skills to obtain a special position. They must participate in organizational life, mass work, and actual class struggle, continually transforming their own thoughts, feelings, and social relationships through these activities.
So we have always emphasized:
Transformation through labor cannot be separated from ideological struggle; ideological struggle cannot be separated from organizational life; organizational life cannot be separated from mass practice.
If the three are separated, each can lapse into formalism.
VII. On the question of violence, Comrade yohaku and we also place our emphasis differently
Comrade yohaku devotes considerable space to making one point: violence did not suddenly appear only later in the Cultural Revolution; Japanese society at the time could readily learn of its existence from news reports. He therefore opposes explaining the Cultural Revolution as “merely a peaceful struggle of words in its early stages” in order to reaffirm it.
But at the theoretical level, we would draw a further distinction:
The degree of violence does not itself determine whether something is revolutionary.
Old social relationships are, of course, coercive, and sharp conflicts will inevitably arise when the masses resist them. But the same form of intense struggle can serve entirely different political lines.
Without a correct class line, mass organizations, and a distinction between contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and contradictions among the people, so-called “rebellion” can also degenerate into factional struggle, petty-bourgeois adventurism, or even simple revenge.
Thus, what we emphasize more is:
What determines whether a struggle has proletarian political content is not how intense it is, but what class line leads it, whom it targets, what mass forces it relies on, and what social relationships it ultimately seeks to change.
On this point, we would neither equate “violence” directly with “revolution” nor deny the violence that actually occurs in complex class struggles. But what must be made clear is that, in socialist China, during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, violence was not the only means of resisting emerging bourgeois elements. It was often a means by which capitalist roaders incited the masses to fight among themselves, and often a means by which backward members of the masses with anarchist ideas settled ideological differences. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was led by correct leaders and a political party and could not do without direction from revolutionary authority; it cannot be understood through anarchist ideas. We do not deny that violence occurred during the Cultural Revolution, but when such violence was not actively instigated by capitalist roaders, it was either a manifestation of anarchist tendencies or a forced counterattack by the rebels. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution focused on “touching people in the depths of their souls”; its aim was to remold thinking, not to resolve problems through violence. This is the continuation of revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and its form differs from the violent revolution required under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.
VIII. One more issue worth discussing with Comrade yohaku: moral criticism and class analysis
At the end of the article, the educational revolution is expressed as love that asks nothing in return for “children with poor grades,” and phrases such as “fighting injustice” and “acting on behalf of Heaven” are used.
This language can express an aversion to hierarchism very directly. But in our association’s past ideological struggles, we have remained alert to another possibility:
If the issue ultimately becomes “the strong should care for the weak” or “the successful should not bully those who have failed,” then what was originally a question of social relationships may once again become a moral question.
Of course we oppose ranking people by academic credentials, abilities, or grades.
But what we demand is not merely that high achievers be kinder to so-called “poor students.” It is the elimination of the conditions that continually allow academic credentials, knowledge, official positions, and professional abilities to be converted into social privilege.
Otherwise, even if there is a very kind expert today, another expert will appear tomorrow;
and even if a teacher sympathetic to poor students appears today, the schools’ power to assess grades, award credits, and select who advances to higher education will itself remain unchanged.
So we place greater emphasis on changing the institutions, division of labor, and social conditions that produce these relationships. Only by eliminating bourgeois right and the ideology of bourgeois right can “kind people” emerge.