The education revolution remains unrealized

“When a teacher’s lecture is bad, students should be allowed to doze off. When a lecture stinks, drags on, and is boring, dozing off is best. Sleeping rests the mind, restores energy, and is good for the body” (Quotations on Education by Chairman Mao).

These words of Chairman Mao are delightful and invigorating. In schools, teachers wield the power to assign grades and award credits to keep pupils and students down. Deprived of power and hope, pupils and students have no recourse against boring classes except to make a commotion (delinquency) or skip them (refusing to attend school, dropping out). Pupils and students deemed “poor performers” are robbed of their entire future, starting with their “career paths.” Unless they fight the mini-bureaucrats who are their teachers, they cannot take back their classes and make them their own. Chairman Mao’s words are a declaration that pupils and students are the central figures in schools (and classrooms); they offer powerful encouragement and support to those who are powerless.
Japan’s defeat in the war dealt nationalism a blow, and the military was disbanded. But schools remained as they were. “Since the Meiji era, the ideology of ranking has continued to dominate Japanese education without the slightest interruption” (Hiraku Tōyama, Beyond the Principle of Competition, Tarō Jirō Sha, 1976, p. 23). If young people tried to join an anti-authority movement, everyone around them—from parents, siblings, and relatives to their schools and communities—would say, “If you want to change the world, do it after you’ve graduated from a respectable school and become an important person.” The values that prize educational credentials have not changed one bit. The rebellion of young people against this fundamental relationship in society was the Zenkyōtō movement in Japan in the late 1960s and the Cultural Revolution in China.
A considerable number of junior and senior high school students stopped seeing university as their hope in life and chose diverse ways of living that did not revolve solely around university. In fact, this was one of the greatest legacies of the Cultural Revolution and the Zenkyōtō movement. My own junior high school years coincided exactly with the three years of the Cultural Revolution (1966–68), and after that period, my outlook on life, which had left no room for anything but going to university, was a thing of the past.

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The Educational Revolution Has Yet to Be Achieved — Part Two

After the defeat in the war, society began with self-reflection, from the emperor down to ordinary people. It was a matter of “the entire nation repenting.” What had gone wrong, and who was responsible, were concealed. Respect for the individual was emphasized, and groups came to be seen only as something that oppressed individuals. People were expected to become “independent” so that they would never be deceived again. This sentiment also permeated movements opposed to those in power.

In 1955, the Japanese Communist Party repudiated its own founder, Kyuichi Tokuda, as a “patriarch,” and repudiated its own armed struggle as “ultra-left adventurism.” From then on, the Japanese Communist Party increasingly committed itself to a line of “revolution by a majority through parliament.”
In the early 1960s, many literary works from revolutionary China were translated and introduced in Japan. This was because it was a brief honeymoon period between the Chinese Communist Party members in positions of power who would later be criticized during the Cultural Revolution and the “China faction” within the Japanese Communist Party, which followed their lead. It was the eve of the Japanese party’s sharp confrontation with the Chinese party.
Shin Nihon Shuppansha published Selected World Revolutionary Literature (from September 1962) and Selected Chinese Revolutionary Literature (from June 1963). The former covered works from around the world, including Russia, Korea, and Vietnam. Among its Chinese works, the following appeared in succession: Wu Qiang’s The Red Sun, Vols. 1 and 2, translated by Wataru Kaji; Liu Qing’s The Builders, Vols. 1 and 2, translated by the Society for the Study of People’s Literature; Cao Ming’s Riding the Wind and Breaking the Waves, Vols. 1 and 2, translated by Katsumi Minami and Akira Nomoto; and Zhao Shuli’s Changes in Li Village, translated by Hajime Miyoshi and Masao Shimada. In the latter series, the following were published: Luo Guangbin and Yang Yiyan’s Red Crag, Vols. 1–3, translated by Hajime Miyoshi; Hu Wanchun’s Light Illuminates the Earth, translated by Masaru Ito; Li Yingru’s The Battle at the Hotuo River, translated by Kensaku Ishikawa; Feng Deying’s Winter Jasmine, Vols. 1–3, translated by Kajio Kiyama and Saburo Ito; Gao Yunlan’s Spring and Autumn in a Small Town, Vols. 1 and 2, translated by Noboru Maruyama; Han Shui’s Pressing Courageously Forward, translated by Tan Nito; Zhou Libo’s Great Changes in the Mountain Village, Vols. 1–3, translated by Hidee Saijo; and Yang Shuo’s Across the Changbai Mountains, translated by Masao Shimada.

How, then, were these works received by people drawn to revolutionary China?
Toru Kawakami, who in 1964 was chairman of the reconstituted Zengakuren affiliated with the Japanese Communist Party, writes: “… In 1963, the Chinese novel Red Crag, published by Shin Nihon Shuppansha, became a bestseller among student party members. It was a rather romantic adventure novel in which party members who had gone deep underground during the Chinese Revolution emerged into the open as the revolution was achieved. There were secret party members even among police chiefs and prison guards, and they revealed themselves at the very last moment… We, too, would do it ‘that way.’

Those who would enter companies (which, particularly in the case of the University of Tokyo, meant large corporations), those who would pursue a path into the apparatus of power—the bureaucracy—and those who would seek to enter the judiciary, especially as judges, were considered to need a certain amount of ‘study time’ from then on and to avoid appearing too much ‘in public.’ Those who would remain at universities as future researchers, or enter the relatively free private sector, could be open about their affiliation, but the others should keep it clandestine as much as possible…” (Sketches of the 1960s, Jidaisha, 2007, p. 59)

Before the Zenkyoto movement, the Japanese left did not understand revolution as a matter of changing society’s values. Unable to see it as inseparable from changing their own way of life, they thought of it merely as a change of government. This was precisely Liu Shaoqi’s line of self-cultivation, which would later be comprehensively criticized during the Cultural Revolution.
Liu Shaoqi writes:
【Why must Communists cultivate themselves? … Revolutionaries tempered by many years of revolutionary struggle do not necessarily all become outstanding, seasoned revolutionaries. That depends primarily on the revolutionaries’ own efforts and self-cultivation. … Confucius said, ‘At fifteen, I set my heart on learning; at thirty, I stood firm…’ This, too, describes a process of self-training and cultivation; Confucius by no means claims here that he was a ‘sage’ from birth. Mencius said, ‘Thus, when Heaven (?) is about to entrust a great responsibility to a person, it first causes their mind and will to suffer…’ This, too, speaks of the process of training and cultivation that one must undergo to become a great person.】 (Collected Major Works of Liu Shaoqi, Vol. 1, San’ichi Shobo, 1959, pp. 10–17)

The New Left, which emerged in rejection of the Japanese Communist Party, did not have a very different image of revolution. It remained bound to the idea that revolution meant awakening through the acquisition of knowledge, and that each person should undertake ‘self-cultivation’ for the sake of enlightenment. In this ‘self-cultivation’ to become a revolutionary, hierarchical thinking and school-centered thinking themselves were not objects of criticism. Aspiring to rise in status was also accepted if it was for the revolution.
But a ‘revolution’ that cannot change relationships between people is nothing more than a change of regime, and the power it establishes will inevitably become corrupt. Unless the judgment imposed on people that they are ‘not good enough’ is overturned at a societal level, it cannot be called the liberation of the oppressed.
Susumu Nishibe writes:
【One striking characteristic of the Bund generation is that almost all intellectuals who came out of the Bund are university teachers. … Those members of the University of Tokyo Bund who became university teachers seem positively delighted to have submerged themselves, so to speak, in the sea of academia.】 (The 1960 Security Treaty Struggle: A Sentimental Journey, Yosensha, 2007, pp. 177–178)

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The Education Revolution Has Yet to Be Achieved: A Turning Point

The Cultural Revolution began by criticizing “experts” and “authorities” and calling hierarchy itself into question. Of course, the Cultural Revolution had many aspects, including resistance to Western-style modernization and a return to the origins of socialism and communism, which had changed and degenerated. One of those aspects was a revolt against hierarchy by those deemed “poor performers.” In Japan, the All-Campus Joint Struggle movement began. Professors who mouthed “revolutionary” rhetoric while preoccupying themselves with climbing the ranks and protecting their own positions came under criticism.

A letter to Chairman Mao from all the students in Class Four of the third year (that is, the graduating class) at the school (Girls’ No. 1 Middle School) made the following appeal. / The current system of advancement to higher education is an extension of the imperial examination system that persisted for thousands of years in China’s feudal society (the examinations for selecting officials that continued until the Qing dynasty), and it runs counter to what Chairman Mao calls “education in the service of proletarian politics.” Many young people think only of passing university entrance examinations and are possessed by the reactionary idea that “reading a lot of books will bring fame.” Many schools pursue nothing but the rate at which their students advance to higher education; to boast of their “education for the gifted,” they gather only “bookworms” and reject the guidance of workers, peasants, and revolutionary cadres. Such a system of advancement serves the restoration of capitalism and is nothing more than a tool for producing new bourgeois elements and revisionist elements. We therefore propose the following. / (1) Abolish the existing system of advancement starting this year. (2) Graduates of senior middle school should first join the workers, peasants, and soldiers, and proceed to universities and specialized schools only after receiving an “ideological diploma” from workers and peasants. (3) … / If our proposal cannot be adopted nationwide, please try it in Beijing alone this year; if even that is impossible, please use the students of our Class Four as a test case.
(From the June 20, 1966, issue of the Mainichi Shimbun)

The letter was dated June 6. The June 6 issue of the People’s Daily printed the letter in full and stressed: “…What matters is that we can pull out the poisonous roots that produce revisionism, such as ‘technocrats’ and ‘ideological experts,’ and remove the important conditions that give rise to ‘the desire for fame and money,’ ‘individual striving,’ and ‘the path of the white expert.’ That is a great revolution in education” (based on the Japanese translation in Materials on the Chinese Proletarian Cultural Revolution, vol. 1, pp. 351–355, edited by the publishing department of Toho Shoten). In response, on the 13th the Party Central Committee and the State Council decided to “postpone the examinations.” The Cultural Revolution had begun.

There was a prehistory to this. The Cultural Revolution was the spread into the cities of the Socialist Education Movement in the countryside in the first half of the 1960s. More than a decade after the founding of New China, the society of top students and its hierarchical order had not changed at all, and contradictions were erupting everywhere. The July 20, 1966, issue of the Mainichi Shimbun describes an incident from October 1964 in which a third-year senior middle school student in Henan Province disregarded the assigned topic on a midterm examination and submitted a piece criticizing a teacher’s claim that “deepening one’s knowledge is the way to serve the people,” under the title “There Are Revisionists in Our School Too.” “This ‘answer’ sparked a major debate among the teachers. Quite a few argued that it was ‘an excellent essay that broke out of the conventional mold’ and deserved full marks, but they were overruled by the ‘authority faction,’ who insisted that ‘it ignores the question, its content is too radical, and allowing something like this would undermine teachers’ authority.’ It was given a zero” (ibid.).
In Japan too, young people objected to the deterioration of education and medicine, environmental destruction and pollution born of the arrogance of an unquestioning faith in science, and, furthermore, complicity in the Vietnam War. In China, moreover, the imperial examination system had remained in place until just a few decades earlier; the values that gave “experts” and “authorities” sway remained deeply rooted even after the founding of New China.
One thing that conveyed the spirit

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@四八 四八 is here! How have you been lately? Are you still studying at a vocational secondary school?

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I’m on break at the moment and working at a garment factory. The working conditions are pretty grueling.

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Is it an internship at a factory?

The Educational Revolution Is Yet to Be Achieved — Conclusion

Has the basic structure of a society in which “experts” and “authorities” hold sway really changed?

In 1990 and 1991, Sayo Kitamura visited China and taught Japanese in Changchun. She repeatedly encountered people expressing the view, in post–Cultural Revolution China, that “we don’t show affection to children who don’t do well.”

When she spoke to a Chinese colleague who taught Japanese, she was told, “Even parents don’t show affection to children who don’t do well.” Come to think of it, she had also read this in an autobiography: “I was timid and didn’t do well in school, so my father didn’t show me affection. But when I started getting good grades, that changed.”
(China, Where I Lived Again, Gendai Shokan, 1992)

Children who do not do well are not valued. This shows that the Cultural Revolution, which profoundly shook the emphasis on rankings and schooling, has still not brought about a change in values.

I am not saying that credentialism is bad and meritocracy is good. Credentialism is itself merely one expression of meritocracy. During the Cultural Revolution, Yu Luoke criticized the doctrine of bloodline—that membership in the “Five Red Categories,” or one’s family background, determined one’s revolutionary character—and provoked resistance from officials in power who sought to protect their own positions. Chen Boda tried to settle the matter with a compromise: family background mattered, but so did political practice. The issue, however, remains unresolved. The social hierarchy of the pre-liberation era—emperor, officials, common people, displaced people—has merely changed form to general secretary of the Party, Party bureaucrats, workers and peasants, and the unemployed. It remains in place.

In the nineteenth century, revolutions broke out in East Asia in response to external pressure from the Western powers. In Japan, the Tokugawa shogunate was overthrown by the Meiji Restoration. Political transformations in China under the Qing dynasty and Korea under the Joseon dynasty were not achieved for nearly another half-century. Why? External causes operate through internal causes. The basis of change lies in internal causes—that is, in the conditions of the actors themselves. From a comparative historical perspective, Toshihiko Mori, known for his research on the political upheaval of 1873, points to a difference in those conditions: the imperial examination system, which China and Korea had but Japan did not (Rediscovering the Meiji Restoration, Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1993, pp. 213–225). The orientation of the educated class toward the center and its emphasis on rank, cultivated and reinforced by fierce competition in the imperial examinations, commanded a powerful cultural hegemony and supported the ruling class.

In the twentieth century, the Cultural Revolution halted “regular” university entrance examinations in China for ten years. In Japan, it halted the University of Tokyo’s entrance examinations for one year and shook an educational system built on the authority to assign grades and award credits. Yet entrance examination systems and competition for admission—the modern equivalents of the imperial examinations—still support the respective systems and stand in the way of those “poor performers” at the bottom. Japan had no mechanism like China’s imperial examinations to sustain and reproduce society’s values. That is why the Meiji Restoration succeeded. But its success, in turn, caused people to forget what the revolution had been for, and for whom. The rank-and-file activists who had led the Restoration from outside the establishment became “elder statesmen” and, to maintain their own rule, built a system with the imperial universities at its apex. Not a single value had changed. The Restoration’s success stripped the revolution of its spirit and turned it, in essence, into a reactionary force. The emphasis on rank and on getting ahead was, if anything, strengthened.

Since the suppression of Saigō Takamori’s Satsuma Rebellion, the greatest uprising in Japan’s modern history, the people’s wisdom that “failure is the mother of success” has been forgotten. The paper drivers who do nothing and therefore never fail have taken control of the state and society. As a result, a custom has taken root whereby anyone who makes a mistake precisely because they have done some work is subjected to a collective attack by “society.” In this way, the history of the defeated—the poor students—has been hidden, and the histories of rebellion in Japan and China in the late 1960s have been forgotten.

Looking back from the standpoint of educational revolution, was the Cultural Revolution not an enormous experiment in “love for children who do poorly, without expecting anything in return”? Some seem to think that “the Cultural Revolution went too far,” but when we return to its starting point as an educational revolution, we see that it had not gone nearly far enough. This may sound as though I am saying that the violence of that time needed to be even more intense. The form violence will take cannot be known in advance. It will be discovered in the course of revolution. But “rising against injustice” (that is, punishing wrongdoing on behalf of heaven) directed at schools and an emphasis on rank that violently weed out “poor performers” is inevitable.

Where did the soap bubbles / go?
Light and fleeting / they break before they can be touched / where did that lively dream / go?
Mitsuharu Kaneko, “Song of Soap Bubbles”

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In fact, Yu Luoke’s position was not a genuine critique of the revisionist bloodline theory. Rather, it sought to rehabilitate members of the Black Five Categories who held reactionary positions and stubbornly refused to undergo remolding, along with their children. They wanted to exploit the revolutionary masses’ rebellion during the Cultural Revolution, fish in troubled waters, and return to power. There is a related post on the forum that Comrade yohaku can take a look at:

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After reading Comrade yohaku’s “The Educational Revolution Has Yet to Succeed,” I want to discuss specifically the view of the Cultural Revolution reflected in the post, and the common ground and differences between that view and the understanding our association has developed so far.

I think this comparison is meaningful because both sides affirm the revolutionary significance of the Cultural Revolution, and both oppose understanding revolution as a mere change of political power. But if we follow each line of argument further, we find that the theoretical focus of our respective understandings of the Cultural Revolution is not entirely the same.

I. We both oppose understanding revolution as a mere change of political power

There is a very important line in Comrade yohaku’s article:

A “revolution” that cannot change the relationships between people is nothing more than a coup d’état.

This has much in common with our association’s understanding of socialist revolution and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

If a revolution merely replaces the old government and swaps the people at the top for another group who call themselves revolutionaries, while the old social division of labor, hierarchical relationships, privileges based on knowledge, and relations of domination between people remain unchanged, then that revolution has certainly not been completed.

So both sides see the Cultural Revolution as a revolution that reaches deep into everyday social relationships, not merely as an event in high-level politics.

Comrade yohaku focuses on the hierarchical relationships between teachers and students, experts and laypeople, authorities and ordinary people, and high-achieving students and “poor students.” He argues that schools use the power to assess grades and award credits, the system of advancement to higher education, and competition in examinations to designate some people as “outstanding” and others as “people with no prospects”; and that this hierarchy is not confined to schools but is part of the values of society as a whole.

Our association likewise opposes these hierarchical relationships. We have also long held that socialist revolution cannot merely change the nominal ownership of the means of production. It must continue to change the distinctions inherited from the old society between mental and manual labor, cadres and the masses, and town and countryside, as well as the hierarchical ideas arising from those distinctions.

Thus, neither side would understand the so-called “educational revolution” as simply revising textbooks, changing the form of examinations, or replacing one group of teachers with another. Instead, we would ask: Who, exactly, controls knowledge? Who holds the power of evaluation? Can knowledge and official positions be converted into personal social privilege?

This is an important point of common ground between us.

II. We also both oppose the path of left-wing intellectuals who “climb the ladder for the sake of revolution”

I think Comrade yohaku’s criticism of the Japanese Communist Party and, later, parts of the New Left bears a clear resemblance to the problem of “intellectual capital” that we have long criticized.

As he summarizes it, some left-wing young people still accepted the old society’s standards of success. They could talk about revolution while working hard to enter prestigious universities, major corporations, bureaucratic institutions, the legal profession, and academia, and then believe that once they became professors, bureaucrats, or experts, they would be better able to “work for the revolution.”

In this way, revolution did not change their own paths in life. Instead, it became a reason for them to climb the hierarchy of the old society.

The “intellectual capital” our association has criticized in the past also encompasses this problem.

We do not think knowledge itself is bad, still less that the less a person knows, the more revolutionary they are. What we oppose is a person turning the theory, technical skills, academic credentials, writing ability, and organizational experience they possess into personal capital, then using those things to gain a position above ordinary workers in exchange for a more comfortable life, greater authority, and greater separation from the masses.

Thus, both sides oppose this phenomenon:

Opposing capitalism’s hierarchy in words while, in practice, desperately trying to become part of its upper ranks.

This is also why we both believe that revolution cannot be merely a change in political views; it must also involve changes in ways of life and relationships between people.

III. But our starting points for understanding the Cultural Revolution are not entirely the same

Here a fairly clear difference begins to emerge.

The central thread of Comrade yohaku’s article is “hierarchism.”

In his account, one very important aspect of the Cultural Revolution is that it was “a revolt by those deemed incapable against hierarchism.”

The article therefore repeatedly uses contrasts such as these: “poor students” and high-achieving students; failures and successes; laypeople and experts; ordinary people and authorities; students and teachers.

From this perspective, the Cultural Revolution was an uprising by those held down in the social hierarchy against the authorities who determined their fate. While our association likewise takes these phenomena seriously, we would not take “poor students rebelling against high-achieving students” or “laypeople rebelling against experts” as the starting point of class analysis in itself. This method of analysis tends, in fact, to depart from class analysis and takes on an anarchist character.

What we emphasize more is: Why does socialist society continue to produce new hierarchical relationships? And why might those relationships give rise to a bourgeoisie anew?

Our answer centers mainly on the bourgeois right and the various social distinctions that continue to exist in socialist society.

Distinctions between mental and manual labor, between cadres and the masses, and between managers and those they manage still exist. Knowledge, technical skills, and official positions can still bring different conditions of distribution and social standing. Under such conditions, knowledge, positions, managerial authority, and social connections can all gradually become special resources held by individuals.

So, in our understanding, the Cultural Revolution was not simply a “revolution against hierarchy” in a general sense. It was a practice of continuing class struggle under socialism, restricting bourgeois right, and preventing the formation of new bourgeois relations.

This leads the two sides to understand the same phenomenon differently.

For example, when faced with “experts suppressing ordinary people,” Comrade yohaku sees first the inequality between authorities and ordinary people. We would ask further:

Why can the knowledge this expert possesses be converted into power over the masses? Has this knowledge already become personal capital? What social division of labor and organizational relationships produce this privilege?

IV. Being “oppressed” does not automatically mean holding a “proletarian standpoint”

This is another important difference between the two sides.

Comrade yohaku is deeply concerned with those whom schools judge to be “no good,” a concern that runs through the entire article. At the end, he even describes the Cultural Revolution as a kind of love that asks nothing in return for “children with poor grades.”

We can understand why he puts it this way. But from the standpoint of our association’s class analysis, being “held down” does not, by itself, directly establish a person’s class standpoint.

A person may be a poor student, may have failed the college entrance examination, may lack academic credentials, may be looked down on by experts, or may be oppressed at school. But none of these things in themselves guarantees that the person will develop a proletarian worldview as a result.

Oppressed people may likewise seek to get rich or rise above others, and they may hope to become new authorities themselves one day.

Conversely, someone with extensive specialized knowledge does not automatically become bourgeois simply by virtue of possessing that knowledge.

Thus, what we oppose is not “people with knowledge” but intellectual capital and the idea of private ownership of knowledge; not the specialized division of labor itself, but propertied-class intellectuals using specialized knowledge to gain privileges that separate them from the masses.

From this starting point, our view is: Oppose intellectual capital, not knowledge; oppose rule by experts, not specialized knowledge; oppose the “white and expert” path, rather than treating “not knowing how to do anything” as revolutionary in itself.

This is also why we believe the Cultural Revolution must be combined with proletarianization.

V. Our understanding of “ideological struggle” goes further than simply opposing authority

Comrade yohaku criticizes Liu Shaoqi-style “self-cultivation,” as well as the Japanese left’s understanding of revolution as a process of individual study, individual awakening, and individual advancement.

This accords with our opposition to theories of individual self-cultivation divorced from actual class struggle.

But we do not therefore reject ideological remolding itself.

On the contrary, our association has consistently emphasized ideological struggle.

The question is not “whether to remold oneself” but how one remolds oneself.

If so-called ideological remolding consists merely of a person shutting themselves away to read, reflect, and improve their moral cultivation, training themselves to become a “revolutionary” more noble than others, then it remains a form of petty-bourgeois individual self-cultivation.

The ideological struggle we speak of must take place within actual class practice.

A person’s individualism, hierarchical thinking, belief in the private ownership of knowledge, desire for comfort and enjoyment and for getting something without working for it, fear of taking responsibility, and tendency to vulgarize relationships between comrades—none of these problems arises in the study, and none can be resolved through reflection in the study alone.

They must be exposed through labor, mass work, organizational life, actual revolutionary tasks, and criticism and self-criticism, and then transformed through collective struggle.

So, as we understand it, ideological struggle is not just resistance to oppression by others. It also includes continually asking oneself: Am I also seeking to become a new authority?

A student’s resistance to a teacher’s authority today does not guarantee that the student will not seek to become a professor tomorrow. A young person’s resistance to bureaucrats today does not guarantee that, after gaining an official position, they will not become a new bureaucrat. A person’s opposition to experts’ privileges today does not guarantee that, after acquiring more theoretical knowledge, they will not turn theory into their own intellectual capital.

Thus, in our view, the Cultural Revolution is not only a struggle waged by the masses against old authorities; it is also a struggle in which revolutionaries continually confront the class habits of the old society within themselves. We believe the more important questions are: What conditions continually reproduce capitalist relations? How can those conditions be restricted and eliminated?

VI. This leads to a further difference in the importance we attach to “proletarianization”

In this article by Comrade yohaku, “proletarianization” is not a particularly prominent concept.

The article mainly discusses rebellion, opposition to hierarchy and expert authority, and changing social values.

For our association, by contrast, proletarianization is precisely a central issue connecting the Cultural Revolution with ideological struggle.

By proletarianization, we do not mean simply sending intellectuals to work in factories for a few months, still less that taking part in manual labor will automatically improve a person’s thinking.

If a person works every day but cares only about wages, technical proficiency, and their own comfortable life, and has no interest in the struggles of the masses, organizational life, or revolutionary tasks, then labor in itself will not automatically change their worldview.

Proletarianization means a change in a person’s entire way of social life.

Intellectuals must enter into labor and the life of the masses over the long term, making the knowledge they possess available for collective use. They must change the path in life of relying on knowledge, academic credentials, and technical skills to obtain a special position. They must participate in organizational life, mass work, and actual class struggle, continually transforming their own thoughts, feelings, and social relationships through these activities.

So we have always emphasized:

Transformation through labor cannot be separated from ideological struggle; ideological struggle cannot be separated from organizational life; organizational life cannot be separated from mass practice.

If the three are separated, each can lapse into formalism.

VII. On the question of violence, Comrade yohaku and we also place our emphasis differently

Comrade yohaku devotes considerable space to making one point: violence did not suddenly appear only later in the Cultural Revolution; Japanese society at the time could readily learn of its existence from news reports. He therefore opposes explaining the Cultural Revolution as “merely a peaceful struggle of words in its early stages” in order to reaffirm it.

But at the theoretical level, we would draw a further distinction:

The degree of violence does not itself determine whether something is revolutionary.

Old social relationships are, of course, coercive, and sharp conflicts will inevitably arise when the masses resist them. But the same form of intense struggle can serve entirely different political lines.

Without a correct class line, mass organizations, and a distinction between contradictions between ourselves and the enemy and contradictions among the people, so-called “rebellion” can also degenerate into factional struggle, petty-bourgeois adventurism, or even simple revenge.

Thus, what we emphasize more is:

What determines whether a struggle has proletarian political content is not how intense it is, but what class line leads it, whom it targets, what mass forces it relies on, and what social relationships it ultimately seeks to change.
On this point, we would neither equate “violence” directly with “revolution” nor deny the violence that actually occurs in complex class struggles. But what must be made clear is that, in socialist China, during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, violence was not the only means of resisting emerging bourgeois elements. It was often a means by which capitalist roaders incited the masses to fight among themselves, and often a means by which backward members of the masses with anarchist ideas settled ideological differences. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was led by correct leaders and a political party and could not do without direction from revolutionary authority; it cannot be understood through anarchist ideas. We do not deny that violence occurred during the Cultural Revolution, but when such violence was not actively instigated by capitalist roaders, it was either a manifestation of anarchist tendencies or a forced counterattack by the rebels. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution focused on “touching people in the depths of their souls”; its aim was to remold thinking, not to resolve problems through violence. This is the continuation of revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and its form differs from the violent revolution required under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

VIII. One more issue worth discussing with Comrade yohaku: moral criticism and class analysis

At the end of the article, the educational revolution is expressed as love that asks nothing in return for “children with poor grades,” and phrases such as “fighting injustice” and “acting on behalf of Heaven” are used.

This language can express an aversion to hierarchism very directly. But in our association’s past ideological struggles, we have remained alert to another possibility:

If the issue ultimately becomes “the strong should care for the weak” or “the successful should not bully those who have failed,” then what was originally a question of social relationships may once again become a moral question.

Of course we oppose ranking people by academic credentials, abilities, or grades.

But what we demand is not merely that high achievers be kinder to so-called “poor students.” It is the elimination of the conditions that continually allow academic credentials, knowledge, official positions, and professional abilities to be converted into social privilege.

Otherwise, even if there is a very kind expert today, another expert will appear tomorrow;

and even if a teacher sympathetic to poor students appears today, the schools’ power to assess grades, award credits, and select who advances to higher education will itself remain unchanged.

So we place greater emphasis on changing the institutions, division of labor, and social conditions that produce these relationships. Only by eliminating bourgeois right and the ideology of bourgeois right can “kind people” emerge.

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The eight points you raised, especially points three through eight, are very important, and I agree strongly and deeply with them.

Through 19 years of struggle and criticism since I wrote this text in 2007, I have learned the meaning of class character and the decisive significance of the struggle for proletarianization. I have also learned that self-transformation and ideological transformation are not matters of ethics or morality, and cannot be accomplished except through actual struggle.

Through this struggle and criticism, I have gradually transformed my perceptual knowledge (!) in support of the Cultural Revolution at the time into rational knowledge. And on international questions as well, I have come to recognize anew the correctness of Maoism rather than Hoxhaism.

I intend to sum up and report on my experience in organizational activities so far, along with my reflections on it.

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Isn’t “touching the depths of the soul” something that traitor Lin said?

“Touching the depths of the soul” is a phrase from the CPC Central Committee’s notification on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.
The words of Lin Biao you are referring to should be “a revolution erupting in the depths of the soul.”
The two have completely different meanings. The former states that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a comprehensive, thoroughgoing revolution in the realm of the superstructure, particularly in the realm of ideology. It is a great revolution aimed at transforming people’s worldviews, a revolution aimed at eliminating all old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits.
The latter, however, means opposing people’s efforts to transform the world through practice and keeping revolutionary struggle confined to the brain.

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After reading the article written by Comrade yohaku, I also learned a great deal about the Cultural Revolution and about Japan during that period. In fact, I think the educational revolution is fundamentally determined by the social revolution. Take this point, for example.

Why are children with poor grades or less ability looked down on at school? Fundamentally, it is because under the capitalist social system, good grades mean access to higher and better educational qualifications and a greater stock of knowledge capital. In the future, they can then rely more on that knowledge capital to attain a higher social position in capitalist society and take part in the distribution of surplus value. This is very important to propertied-class parents who regard their children as private property, because it means that the property of the private-property-based nuclear family can be passed on smoothly. It also determines what kind of life those parents can lead in old age. The same is true for teachers: the more “good students” they produce, the greater their reputation becomes. More parents who want their children to make their fortunes will send those children to them for instruction, their positions will improve, and they will earn more money.

I went through these things myself in the past. From childhood, my mother instilled in me the idea that I had to keep climbing upward. She often brought up our neighbor’s daughter. She said our neighbor had worked hard to move from the countryside to the city, and then his daughter had gone from a small city to Beijing for university. She encouraged me to make that kind of “leap” too. When I was in junior high school, my mother told me outright: in junior high, only students with good grades are liked by teachers. That is because, in China, only junior-high students with good grades can get into regular high schools; more than half of the others can only go to vocational high schools or go straight into the hardest, most exhausting jobs. When my grades were poor in junior high, the teachers and some of the top students looked down on me. But when I got into the best high school in the provincial capital, those teachers’ and top students’ attitudes toward me changed by 180 degrees. (At the time, I too was immersed in fantasies of using knowledge capital to exploit more surplus value in the future and then living a good life. After I got into a prestigious university, I fantasized about these things even more, and I also lived a life of the exploiting class, indulging myself and freely consuming surplus value.)

Later, I went to work in a factory to reform myself through labor. Some workers knew about my educational qualifications and thought it was a pity for me. What did they think was a pity? Mainly that I could have found an easier, better-paying job, but had come to work in a factory instead. This shows that the worship of educational qualifications and ability is, in fact, the worship of money and of the bourgeoisie. Marx once said, “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas.” This is because the bourgeoisie must use the superstructure, particularly the ideological superstructure, to maintain the economic base of bourgeois exploitation of the proletariat. So, through both its actions and its propaganda, it must foster worship of the bourgeoisie and of making a fortune through exploitation. As a tool for the bourgeoisie to propagate bourgeois ideas, schools are naturally places where this reactionary thinking is concentrated. And propertied-class parents, along with teachers who serve as tools of bourgeois propaganda, naturally accept and put this thinking into practice.

At the same time, poor grades and lack of ability are not due to anything innate. They have social roots and are determined by class differences. Generally speaking, children from proletarian and peasant families have to do some work from a very young age because their families are poor. Many do not even live with their parents but are raised by their grandparents. When they go to school, they do not have good teachers, nor can they access tutoring resources. Children from wealthy families, by contrast, not only have more time to read and study; their families also provide them with better conditions and expose them to more of the world. During their education, they can attend better schools, and their parents can enroll them in all kinds of extra classes or even hire someone to teach them one-on-one. Naturally, these students have good grades and strong abilities.

I once watched an NHK documentary, China: A Turbulent Land. Its prologue, “The Rich and Migrant Workers”, contrasted children from migrant-worker families with children from wealthy bourgeois families. Children from bourgeois families grow up in spacious homes and start learning English at a very young age to prepare for studying abroad. But children from migrant-worker families live in small, dilapidated houses in the countryside. One child with a broken arm could not receive treatment because the family could not afford the surgery. It is already quite clear which family’s children will have better grades and stronger abilities in the future.

So, to change this situation, we cannot rely solely on students’ struggles. First, under the leadership of the proletariat, we must carry out a revolution against the bourgeoisie and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only then can we transform the vast superstructure, particularly the ideological superstructure. In socialist China in the past, it was precisely in the fierce class struggle between capitalist restoration and opposition to restoration after the founding of the state that the question of transforming schools and education was taken up. In the end, resolving this question also depended on the working class transforming the old schools. On the basis of that transformation, the July 21 Universities were established, grounded in the working class and not aimed at cultivating an intellectual aristocracy. Today, if students want to change this, they must link their efforts with the struggle and liberation of the proletariat. Otherwise, a student who is, after all, petty-bourgeois has neither the power nor the standpoint to change any of this.

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I read Comrade typhoon’s post and could relate to it. I agree.

Could you tell me one thing? When, where, and how was the “July 21 University” established?

On July 21, 1968, Chairman Mao added the following passage to the proof of the editor’s note in the People’s Daily accompanying “The Road to Training Engineering and Technical Personnel as Seen from the Shanghai Machine Tool Factory (An Investigation Report)”: “Universities must still be run. What I am mainly saying here is that universities of science and engineering must still be run, but the length of study must be shortened, education must be revolutionized, proletarian politics must be put in command, and the path taken by the Shanghai Machine Tool Factory in training technical personnel from among the workers must be followed. Students must be selected from among workers and peasants with practical experience; after studying at school for a few years, they should return to the practice of production.” This directive became known as the “July 21 Directive.”

In fact, these were measures to restrict the distinction between mental and manual labor and to restrict bourgeois right. They would enable the broad working class to acquire technology and knowledge without becoming detached from productive labor. They would change the situation in which the old schools were detached from society and from practice, and were controlled by members of the bourgeoisie.

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This is an excerpt from Socialist Political Economy explaining the “July 21 Universities.”

In the educational revolution, the worker-peasant-soldier students at Liaoning’s Chaoyang Agricultural College and at the July 21 Workers’ University, first established by the Shanghai Machine Tool Factory, all came from production practice and returned to it after graduation. They placed themselves on an equal footing with workers and poor and lower-middle peasants, maintaining roughly the same standard of living as them. This revolution in the field of education not only greatly helped to train successors to the proletarian revolutionary cause, but also created conditions for narrowing the gap in remuneration between manual and mental workers and expanding the elements of distribution according to need.

—*Socialist Political Economy*
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Actually, I’m not very clear on exactly where July 21 universities existed or how they operated. I’ll need to consult some relevant sources for the specifics later.
Still, based on what I’ve learned before, I have some thoughts. Chairman Mao formulated the July 21 Directive in response to the masses’ need to wage class struggle, drawing lessons from that struggle. It showed hundreds of millions of people the way forward in their unremitting struggle against the bourgeoisie within the Party, which had taken control of education.
Many films from the socialist period dealt with education. Other comrades and I have watched quite a few of them together. Social being determines social consciousness, and these films all arose from real class struggle. They depict how Chairman Mao’s call for the proletariat to take control of education was put into practice. The bourgeoisie could no longer be allowed to rule our schools. For example, children of workers and peasants were admitted to universities; factory workers studied Marxist classics in their spare time and used them to guide class struggle and the struggle for production; university students took part in productive labor, combined with workers and peasants, and went to the countryside to receive re-education from poor and lower-middle peasants. All these measures and practices were intended to make education serve the training of successors to the proletarian cause. In a word, they took class struggle as the key link.
In all past societies ruled by exploiting classes, the right to education was something only the exploiting classes could enjoy. The exploited classes were excluded from schools and had no right to education. The exploiting classes would only indoctrinate the people with reactionary religion or reactionary theories, pursuing a policy of keeping the people ignorant to maintain their reactionary rule. This was true of Catholicism in medieval Europe and Confucianism in ancient China. That reactionary slaveholder, Old Kong the Second, said, “The people may be made to follow it, but they may not be made to understand it,” denying poor working people the right to education. Although socialist society is one in which the proletariat has seized political power, intense class struggle still exists. The struggle is especially fierce and complex in education and other areas of the superstructure. The bourgeoisie, having lost its ruling power, tries by every possible means to restore the paradise it lost. It treats education, where it still holds some ground, as a bridgehead from which to launch attacks on the proletariat. I remember a scene like this in Breaking with Old Ideas, a film from socialist China that I watched: bourgeois education experts say that students from worker and peasant backgrounds should not be admitted to university, but Principal Long, a revolutionary who upholds the proletarian revolutionary line, supports admitting the children of peasants and other working people. He also argues that education must train successors to the proletarian cause and contribute to the development of agricultural and industrial production, rather than pursuing abstract theoretical research divorced from the practical needs of production for the sake of personal fame, profit, and status. Similar fierce struggles continued for many, many years after the founding of New China.
Chairman Mao always enthusiastically supported and helped the proletariat in its struggle against the bourgeoisie. When he recognized that the bourgeoisie still wanted to corrupt young people and restore capitalism by training successors to its own cause, he put forward the theory of continuing the revolution and initiated the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. He guided the proletariat in launching a comprehensive counterattack against bourgeois enemies in the ideological sphere, taking the struggle to a higher stage. Workers, peasants, and all working people studied Marxism widely; factories set up workers’ study groups; and the rotten, lifeless educational systems of all exploiting classes were subjected to criticism. The revolutionary line had to be upheld in education, and the bourgeoisie could not be allowed to turn young people into a privileged intellectual elite divorced from the people and from labor. The proletariat had to take control of education. These were all, in fact, expressions of the principles conveyed by the July 21 Directive. In essence, they meant narrowing the gap between mental and manual labor and restricting bourgeois right. Although I don’t know the specifics of the July 21 universities, I think all of this is closely related to them.
This is why socialist China, especially during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was able to leave us a rich and precious intellectual legacy. Many of the theoretical books we read today, accessible pamphlets explaining Marxism-Leninism, and pamphlets on ancient Chinese peasant revolutionary wars and the struggle between Confucianism and Legalism in ancient China bear names such as “Workers’ Study Group of Such-and-Such Factory” or “Marxism Group of Such-and-Such Factory” on their title pages. For example, A Brief History of Peasant Revolutions in Chinese Feudal Society came from the Fanxiang City Workers’ Theory Group, and A Draft History of the Struggle Between Confucianism and Legalism came from the Theory Group of State-Owned Factory No. 356. There are also pamphlets I’ve read before criticizing the way feudal Confucian thought subjugated women; many were written by women workers in factories. There are many more pamphlets like these. They are the great achievements of factory workers in the past who put the July 21 Directive into practice by studying, mastering, and applying Marxism.

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Comrade typhoon, Comrade cedar, thank you for explaining the “July 21 University.”

This teaching of Chairman Mao comes from Chapter 13, Section 9 of Marx’s Capital. Here Marx writes: 【There can be no doubt that, with the inevitable conquest of political power by the working class, technological education—both theoretical and practical—will acquire its proper place in working-class schools.】

Following the Chinese Revolution, Liu Shaoqi proposed a “two-track labor system” and a “two-track education system” in 1964. Liu Shaoqi treated “half-work, half-study” students, who were distinguished from those at full-time elite schools, as apprentices and temporary workers, forcing students aged 14 and 15 to work grueling night shifts under a three-shift rotation system.

The half-work, half-study students saw through this as a new form of elitism in practice, despite its professed commitment to practical education, and rose in rebellion.

In early 1967, they established the National Liaison Committee of Half-Work, Half-Study Rebels alongside the National General Corps of Red Worker Rebels, criticizing and denouncing the system as follows: 【The current contract labor system splits the working class into two strata and, by creating disparities, divides and disintegrates the revolutionary ranks of the proletariat. It not only constrains the revolutionary initiative of the working masses and impedes the development of the social productive forces, but also sows the seeds of revisionism and serves as a breeding ground for capitalist restoration. The handful of people in power within the Party taking the capitalist road are using this revisionist system to completely deprive tens of millions of workers of their political rights. After Liu Shaoqi toured various parts of Hebei Province in March 1964 and delivered his report, the Ministry of Labor used that report as the basis for formalizing this system as the contract and temporary labor system, which was implemented nationwide.】

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Learn Some Political Economy, edited by Shanghai People’s Publishing House, through which I studied political economy, was also compiled as part of the “three-in-one” study movement. Specifically, it is said to be based on writings by the Workers’ Political Economy Study Group at Shanghai No. 4 Hosiery Factory, the Department of Political Economy at Fudan University, and the Economics Class of the Sixth Company at the Shanghai May Seventh Cadre School. It is not a product of scholars working at their desks, but a guide to practice that advanced working people have already internalized.

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